

## **Europe's Role in the New World Order – Partner or Counterweight to America?**

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Should Europe be a partner or a counterweight to the U.S. in global and regional security matters? This would be asking the wrong question. A security partnership between Europe and the U.S. – or as the Americans tend to label it, “a partnership in leadership” – can only be based on Europe's capability to provide a counterweight if necessary. This necessity will be defined by Europe's interests and a European security philosophy that continues to differ from the American approach.

Europe has become a partner of the U.S. in the global trade system. Both partners together serve as the motor of the World Trade Organization, WTO. Third parties such as China or coalitions of smaller countries can block decisions in the WTO. However, no progress can be achieved when Europe and the U.S. have not agreed on a common negotiating platform in advance. Europe and the U.S. have different interests and represent different regulatory philosophies in the global trade system. However, with the WTO both partners have agreed on a common framework of governance for this policy area.

France and Germany have built a solid partnership inside of the European Union. In the post-World War II period, both countries decided to balance their opposing economic and political interests by pushing for European integration. France and Germany have been true partners in leadership. The post-war deal between both countries was renewed and deepened with the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of both a Political Union and the Economic and Monetary Union. The much acclaimed “friendship” between Germany and France is not based on similar interests, but on a voluntaristic decision to push ahead with European integration. Ultimately, the European project has served both countries' domestic as well as foreign policy interests – as different as these may be. The inclusion of other EU member states – Poland could be such a case – into the Franco-German partnership in leadership will be possible only if based on a similar voluntaristic act.

After the U.S.-European rift on Iraq, the transatlantic security relationship needs to be redefined. This redefinition should not involve the mere duplication of Europe's post-war security dependency on the U.S. Europe should ask itself how its own security interests – including different interests of member states with different historical experiences and perspectives – can be guaranteed by a new governance structure in which Europe has a decisive say. To redefine the U.S. role and mandate in Europe, we need to have an honest transatlantic conversation on our differing threat analyses and the instrumentaria that we have in mind to counter those threats.

It is obvious that, before September 11, both Europe and the U.S. underestimated the threat presented by terrorist activities possessing a global reach. In the U.S., the even larger threat of a combination of terrorist methods with weapons of mass destruction has been widely discussed since the early 1990s.<sup>1</sup> The European debate has largely neglected this issue. However, the subordination of other threats as well as crucial regional and international security issues to the “war against terrorism,” as proposed by the new U.S. National Security Strategy, runs counter to European policy priorities. Regional conflicts – such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and conflicts in the Kashmir region and the Horn of Africa – cannot be subsumed under the issue of terrorism. The greater security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are all consequences of phenomena that involve change at a global level. Climate change, resource depletion and migration from economic and ecological disaster zones are some of the

more pressing examples of these types of new threats. Our conversation with the U.S. must start with the question of how we analyze and prioritize threats.

Most of today's threats and conflicts are of an asymmetric character. Increased military capabilities do not always provide an answer to them. Therefore, the future of Europe's Security and Defense Policy does not lie in creating an expensive U.S.-style global intervention force, but in the development of instruments and capabilities for civil and policy-based intervention. Strengthening international law and working toward a more just economic globalization will provide the framework for countering today's asymmetric threats with a new set of mainly non-military instruments.

However, Europe's military will continue to be needed and must therefore be modernized and re-oriented toward the new threats as described above. In the long term, this must lead to the creation of a common European army, instead of the 25 national armies of an enlarged Europe. Steps toward this vision, such as a European Procurement Agency, have recently been proposed by Germany and France. Europe must also modernize part of its military equipment, such as its air transport and reconnaissance capabilities. Europe's commitment to regional and global stability must grow, both politically as well as financially. Those stability costs will contain a military budget that fulfills Europe's security needs. However, an increase in military spending alone will not be the answer.

Europe must invest politically as well as financially in international security and governance structures. Our focus must be to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to be a more relevant forum for decisions on global security issues as well as for operational tasks in conflict prevention, crisis management and nation-building. To achieve that mission, the EU must acquire a unified voice inside the UN.

The post-war reconstruction of Iraq and the surrounding region will provide a test case for Europe's ability to project its interests as well as its capabilities to provide assistance via the UN. If the UN is to play a strong role in post-war Iraq, this role cannot be based on a belated legitimization of the U.S.-led war. Europe's commitment to help the Iraqi people and to transform the region into a more democratic place must go beyond the provision of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, Europe should not subsidize a U.S.-led military administration. The UN – with key support from the EU – must have a leading role in the political, economic and societal reconstruction of Iraq. The political room for this role must be created in – probably difficult – negotiations with the U.S. and in an ongoing conversation with the Iraqi opposition.

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<sup>1</sup> See the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; [www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org)