



COMMISSION ON  
GLOBALISATION

# “NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES”

*Choices for the World after Iraq*


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**BRIEFING PAPERS**

AND

**BACKGROUND PAPERS**



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The conference is co-organised by the

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Commission on Globalisation  
and  
State of the World Forum**

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For all papers, please refer to the Conference link on the ECPA website, [www.publicaffairs.ac](http://www.publicaffairs.ac)

**NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES:  
CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

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**AS THE RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE CONTINUES, FURTHER BACKGROUND  
PAPERS OF INTEREST, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THIS BOUND DOCUMENT, WILL  
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# **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

## **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 1**

### **“BEYOND GULLIVERIZATION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?”**

**- Gordon Smith** - Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

Lenin famously asked just over one hundred years ago “What is to be done?” So should we, as we prepare for our meeting on “National Sovereignty and Universal Challenges”. For this meeting to be a success, something more than just another interesting conference, we need to think in advance about what would constitute a positive result, and then work to that end. I believe we need to end the meeting with a view, perhaps differing views, about what should follow. Where do we take the dialogue after Brussels? We need to know what is to be done.

This means getting beyond analyzing, interesting though that is, how the world is changing, becoming more interdependent, and challenging old forms of sovereignty. We need to get beyond identifying villains and heroes or heroines. The blame game won't help.

We know a “new world order” is not just around the corner, and that preventing deadly conflict remains a high priority. We know globalization presents huge challenges as well as opportunities, and that it needs to be shaped so more can benefit. We know the United States is, by a considerable margin, the most powerful country in the world. We know its present leadership, but other Americans as well, feel their country is seriously threatened.

There are those who argue for re-establishing a multi-polar system in the world. It is clear this would not only not be welcomed by the U.S., but would be actively resisted. It is also clear that the U.S. will resist “Gulliverization”, being tied down by the Lilliputians of the world. We should know by now how *not* to deal with the United States. There is a perception in the U.S. that much of the world wants to check or constrain American power. Not surprisingly, the U.S. is not going to cooperate in such an endeavour. We need to find a better way.

Yet the reality is that we are living in an increasingly interdependent world, a world in which “mutual vulnerability” is significantly increased and will increase further. Sovereignty is, in truth, not what it used to be – although it does not follow that there will be a “withering away of the state”, as Marxists predicted, a prediction echoed by current commentators as well. Rather states have to share central stage with other actors, non-state actors such as NGOs and business. But states, by and large, have a distinct role both because of their authority and legitimacy.

We know there are major global challenges to be faced: climate change, biodiversity, ocean fisheries, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, infectious disease, poverty and more. We need more than trying to muddle through to respond to them.

What we really need is to reengage the United States in building more effective ways of managing our global interdependence. The U.S. has led in this effort in the past and needs to again. But it won't happen if American leaders believe that, between the lines, the real purpose of much of the rest of the world is to constrain U.S. power.

What is to be done? We need to identify the major global challenges which require “governance” beyond the level of the state. We won't be able to do them all, so that is why setting priorities is important. We then need to design effective and innovative forms of governance. In many cases these new forms can and indeed should include non-state actors. We need to work with Americans, inside and outside the Administration. Above all what we must not do is to corner and isolate the U.S. That won't work. Nor should we be advocating multilateralism as an end in itself. The same is true for international institutions, including the United Nations. That is not sufficiently plausible. Multilateralism and international organizations are means to an end, critical means, but not ends.

Three years ago, with Moises Naim, I wrote a small book, ALTERED STATES: Globalization, Sovereignty, and Governance, published by the International Development Research Centre. Many of the arguments remain true. States are in fact changing. Globalization, seen in its multidimensional definition, is driving the process. Sovereignty is changing and new forms of global governance are both a reality and increasingly needed. If I was to rewrite the book now I would be much more explicit about engaging the United States in the process. The question is how best to do this, I hope that some ideas will come out of this important meeting.

**June 8th 2003, Victoria, British Columbia**

# NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

## BRIEFING PAPER NO. 2

### “AMERICA AS EMPIRE: GLOBAL LEADER OR ROGUE IMPERIUM?”

- **Jim Garrison** – President, State of the World Forum

The United States has become what it was founded not to be. Established as a haven for those fleeing the abuse of power, it has attained and now wields nearly absolute power. It has become an empire. This is meant as a statement of fact, not a judgment of national character. It is a way of understanding America, not an indictment against American policy. Indeed, by opening up the possibility of viewing the United States as an empire, one opens up a far larger frame of reference to understand America's history, role in the world, and future responsibilities.

Of all governing institutions, empire is the most complex and extensive in scope. Empire stands at the apex of the social, economic and political pyramid, integrating all tribes, nations and institutions beneath it within a unified order. An empire that is well run is the greatest accolade a nation can receive. An empire devastated is the most damning legacy it can leave behind.

Empires are relationships of influence and control by one state over a group of lesser states. This can take a variety of forms, ranging from territorial annexation and direct political rule to economic domination and diplomatic oversight. Empires are as old as history itself and characterize the earliest stages of human development. For reasons deeply buried in the human soul and psyche, human beings have always competed against one another, and the victors have established dominion over the vanquished and exploited that relationship to benefit themselves. Almost every people on earth has at some point or another expanded and conquered or contracted and been conquered, often many times over and in a variety of combinations.

Viewed historically, the United States is stronger with regard to the rest of the world than any power in the history of the world. It has become a power without peer, controlling nations far beyond its borders and able to operate decisively in virtually any sphere at any level anywhere in the world. As Michael Ignatieff put it in his article “American Empire” in the *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, “It is the only nation that polices the world through five global military commands; maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents; deploys carrier battle groups on watch in every ocean; guarantees the survival of countries from Israel to South Korea; drives the wheels of global trade and commerce; and fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires.”

The United States has become what French political theorist Raymond Aron calls an “imperial republic.” It is an imperial power dominating the international order through military, economic and cultural strength, while simultaneously being a sovereign state, existing within a system of sovereign states equal under international law. The tensions implied by this dual identity are something that must be managed but cannot be fully resolved. As such, different rules apply to the United States, different expectations must be made of it, and different consequences will come of its actions, especially since the United States has such a dialectical mixture of democratic idealism and practical power.

Ironically, the inordinate and unique power of the United States was not immediately recognized when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the Soviet Union disintegrated, either by the Americans or by the rest of the world. While a few observers recognized that America had entered what columnist Charles Krauthammer called a “unipolar moment,” most commentators predicted that the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War would lead to a return to the age-old balance of powers.

Such a view was completely understandable. The last 1,500 years of European history have been essentially multipolar, with the major European powers incessantly competing with one another but without any single power ever gaining undue advantage, whether during the medieval era of city states or the modern era of nation states. Even Britain at its prime during the nineteenth century was constrained by France, Russia, Spain and Germany. During the reign of Queen Victoria, from 1837 – 1901, which marked the apex of British imperial power, Britain had to fight seventy-two separate

military campaigns to keep its rivals at bay and its colonial holdings intact. The very notion of *realpolitik* is predicated upon the assumption of a balance of power between major states.

The fact that the United States has broken out of this multipolar framework to attain unipolar global dominance is an extraordinary achievement in the annals of history, not attained by any power since the time of Rome two thousand years ago. Because the world had gotten so used to thinking in multilateral and multipolar terms, it took some time for the novelty of the historical situation to sink in. Yale historian Paul Kennedy, in his book *Decline of the Great Powers*, went so far as to predict the relative decline of the United States due to “imperial overstretch.” Talk of American weakness dominated the 1992 U.S. Presidential elections with the ultimate victor, Bill Clinton, focusing on fixing the ailing American economy while his rival for the Democratic nomination, Paul Tsongas, repeatedly declared, “The Cold War is over and Japan won.” Margaret Thatcher expressed the commonly held view that the world would evolve into three regional groups, one based on the dollar, one on the mark, one on the yen. Henry Kissinger solemnly predicted the emergence of a multipolar world. Asians, along with some American Asian enthusiasts such as James Fallows, spoke exuberantly of the rise of a “Pacific Century.”

The Clinton Administration (1993-2001) was essentially a transitional period when the United States was emerging as what French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine called a “hyper-power” but was still essentially multilateralist and collaborative in its mentality and behavior. The title of Richard Haas’ book, *The Reluctant Sheriff*, published in 1993, summarized in advance the legacy Clinton was to leave behind. Clinton’s main focus was the integration of the global economy under American hegemony, but he seldom used the power America had at its disposal, seeking rather to work collegially with American allies on issues of common concern. While believing that the U.S. was the “indispensable power,” as his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it, Clinton exercised this indispensability with discretion. He initiated limited military actions against Iraq and the Sudan and led the European coalition in Kosovo. But by and large he remained committed to multilateralism and upholding the international treaties negotiated by his predecessors, including the Antibalistic Missile Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. He also negotiated and supported the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming.

All these treaties framed US strategic interests within the context of collective security considerations. In general, the 1990s were marked by a strong commitment to international law, working within the context of the UN system, and upholding pre-existent treaty obligations. America was certainly the senior partner in all deliberations but the emphasis by Americans and the larger world community was on the importance of partnership as much as on American seniority.

The response by the new Bush Administration to the events of September 11, 2001 changed all that by heightening asymmetries already there but unobserved because unexercised. Right at the point it was emerging as the undisputed superpower, the United States was attacked unexpectedly with devastating impact by non-state actors virtually invisible to the American intelligence apparatus. In one of the strangest synchronicities of modern history, a nation that thought itself invulnerable was made, without warning, completely vulnerable. Its response was to strike out with an overwhelming application of military power in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since September 11, the United States has emphasized national security concerns and preemptive military responses in a war on terrorism that President Bush has declared as the highest priority of American domestic and foreign policy. Multilateralism, where the coalition defines the mission, has been replaced by unilateralism, where the mission defines the coalition. Deterrence, where there is an assumed balance of power, has been superseded by a policy of preemptive strikes, where the U.S. hits first against potential adversaries.

The prerogatives, complexities and shortcomings of America as an imperial republic came into sharp and painful relief during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It was there that the magnitude of American power, as well as its limitations, were displayed before the world.

The events of 9/11 reframed global affairs within the context of national security and the war on terrorism. The invasion of Iraq reframed global affairs yet again within the reality of overwhelming American military power. The invasion was the occasion the Bush Administration chose to

demonstrate American military supremacy to the world. What is extraordinary is that the U.S. exercised its global dominion by seizing the most strategic area in the Middle East.

The invasion of Iraq also brought into sharp relief fundamental changes in the world's perception of America. Fifty years ago, there was an almost universal expression of appreciation and respect for the generosity with which the United States rebuilt Europe and Japan after World War II, for its leadership in establishing the United Nations, and for its willingness to defend democracy from communism. People worldwide embraced America as the leader of the free world and aspired to the democratic ideals they believed America uniquely represented.

However, as the Cold War developed, this positive feeling increasingly turned to criticism, hostility and condemnation. The international community has become resentful at the way America exercises its power. While America certainly protected the free world during the Cold War, America also comported itself in a way that the world increasingly mistrusted. It now seems to many in the international community that U.S. relies more on force than on persuasion, abuses human rights more than it fosters democracy, and exploits the poor more than it protects the weak.

The Bush Administration's response to the events of September 11 dramatically increased the international public's concern about the integrity of America's leadership in the world. The invasion of Iraq in defiance of overwhelming opposition indicates to many that America, the global leader, has become America, the rogue imperium. Anti-American sentiment is on the rise virtually all over the world, including in Europe, traditionally America's strongest ally.

The questions that must be asked are: How did America become so strong? Why is America now acting in a manner that the world increasingly resents? What is going on in the rest of the world that America needs to understand? During and after World War II, American leadership and international needs were aligned. Now they are clearly out of any semblance of alignment. What has changed? What can be done to bring about a new sense of mutual purpose?

At the core of the relationship between America and the world is the issue of where the center of gravity should be for international affairs: the United States or the United Nations? This presents America and the world with a fundamental choice.

At the end of World War II, the United States established the United Nations out of self-interest. Today, the United States disregards the United Nations out of a very different notion of self-interest. The United States founded the United Nations to help prevent war among the nations. The U.S. now considers the UN to be weak, corrupt, inefficient and bureaucratic. At the same time, the UN represents to most people, including many Americans, the desire for a community of nations, governed by the sanctity of international law and cooperating through dialogue and consensus. Whatever its flaws, it is the carrier of the deep human aspiration for peace. The Bush Administration's disparagement of the UN and its willingness to act alone in spite of the UN are of deep concern to the international public.

The challenge for the United Nations and the larger world community is the reality that the United States is no longer a nation among nations. It is an empire among nations, an absolutely key concept in understanding why America is acting the way it is and why the international community is so concerned. America has emerged as an unchallenged superpower, controlling countries and institutions all around the world. As such, it can and will assume certain imperial prerogatives, particularly in the immediate aftermath of September 11.

Both Americans and the world must understand this new reality, whatever the desire of the international community for consensus through the United Nations or for everyone to work together according to the legalities of international law. Empires invariably reserve the right to act in their own interests, precisely because, from an imperial point of view, might makes right. While America was founded as a beacon of light, symbolizing freedom, empires are inevitably about power, relying on force. In assessing American actions, the world must remember from history that military power is the beginning and the end of empire and that empires seek to weaken international law and international institutions in order to maximize maneuverability and maintain dominion. Part of the predicament for the world is that it continues to view America in relation to its light when, in fact, America is now much more about power. This is what it means to say that America has become an empire.

At the same time, America must understand that the world is rapidly becoming an integrated system under the impact of economic globalization and the technology of instantaneous communication. In a globalizing world, cultural nuances and social disparities matter far more than military might, and issues of ethnicity and religion go far deeper than the power of the state. Governance cannot be exercised successfully simply by the application of power. Brute force does not make friends and cannot change a person's mind.

There is increasingly a *civilizational* context for governance that needs to be taken into account. The international community requires leadership that is sensitive to societal and cultural differences as well as to political and economic conditions. It needs leadership that will foster the integrating institutions necessary to bring these complex factors together for the equitable management of the global system. Integrating diversity is only achieved through patience and compromise. It requires honoring all the voices and building consensus within the context of mutual respect and international norms and procedures. Leadership in this context is successful more through influence than by coercion.

This interplay between American power - unsurpassed, militarily oriented, and unilaterally directed, and the needs of an integrating world - highly diverse, culturally conditioned, and requiring compromise in order to effectively govern, is the framework within which the American empire will play out its unique and special destiny during the twenty first century. Both America and the world, for better or for worse, will be shaped by how this is done.

In all probability, the United States will dominate the twenty-first century as Rome dominated the first. The critical question is not *whether* the US will do this but whether it will *acknowledge* that this is what it is doing. Only if it consciously takes up the mantle of leadership will it be able to set forth and implement the coherent series of policies necessary for global stability and prosperity. How the United States comports itself as an imperial republic will determine its own fate as well as the fate of the earth for a long time to come. To the degree to which it exercises its dominion consistent with its founding vision and informed by the lessons it can glean from the experience of other imperial powers, it will endure. It will be remembered as either the architect of the world's first global order or as a tragedy of epic dimensions.

America at its moment of power, the world at its moment of integration: how will they come together? Will the world experience *pax Americana*, the American peace? Or *pox Americana*, the American plague? This is the most fundamental question of our time and the exploration of my forthcoming book *America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Imperium?*

**June 4<sup>th</sup> 2003, San Francisco**

# **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

## **BRIEFING PAPER No.3**

### **“DEALING WITH THE US AFTER IRAQ - RESIST, UNDERSTAND, RESPOND”**

**- Tom Spencer** – Visiting Professor of Global Governance, School of Management, University of Surrey

The sheer scale of America as ‘hyper-power’ is awesome, but the citizens of the rest of the world should also remember that it is also a superbly “hyped” power. The same folk who have brought us the doctrines of pre-emption and US pre-eminence, also perfected ‘shock and awe’ over Baghdad and the successful psych-ops that helped to demolish Saddam Hussein. Given the militarisation of American diplomacy, we may assume that the same attention to the importance of communication and ideas, the decapitation of competitive leadership and the rest will be used in the shock and awe diplomacy now practised by Washington. Divide and rule, bribe and bully, punish and reward, come from the school of thought that regards diplomacy as the extension of war by other means. Such militarisation of diplomacy, and the budgets to support it, has been building in Washington since Newt Gingrich. However it was Osama Bin Laden, one of the architects of the emerging global order, who enabled it to be realised in its current vigorous form. In the political bloodstream of Anglo Saxon states, fear breaks down into hubris. ‘Security anxiety’ is held to justify everything from the extinction of privacy to the invention of intelligence. War and the threat of war inflates the Executive at the expense of the Legislature. The Royal Perogative and its distant relative the Presidential Commander in Chief, face the world certain of where their duty lies. There are three words that the world should write in flame as it struggles to understand its current choices in dealing with untamed US power – Resist, Understand and Respond.

Particularly for Europeans, there is nothing anti-American about resisting the vigorously expressed ideas of the so called “New Reality”. Minxin Pei has pointed to the paradox of American nationalism that sees itself only as benign and value driven. From this flows both an insensitivity in understanding the rest of the world, and the stifling of internal debate in the name of patriotism. Samuel Huntington has written that “Healthy co-operation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of US super powerdom”. After Iraq however, such an option seems to have been ruled out by the Bush Administration in favour of direct competition. Three hundred years of running the planet has left many European political elites with a conviction of their superior wisdom and sophistication and an assumption that everyone is as fascinated by Europe as the Europeans. Such self-obsession renders Europeans vulnerable to American pressure. The current soul-searching about the state of EU/US relations is a case in point. The rough water in the Atlantic is not caused by anything that the Europeans initiated or any inherent defect in Atlantic institutional structures. Rather it is caused by a change in US self-perception that fundamentally alters the nature of the game. The arguments of recent months have in reality been not about Iraq, but about the exercise of global power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe is understandably less important strategically to the Americans. The balance of American interest in European integration has clearly shifted, with the European Union now seen as a global competitor to America at all levels other than the military. Europe should now expect Washington, which has two hundred years experience of setting European powers against each other, to pitch a rough game. Look for American support for a new burst of continent-wide Euro-scepticism and a particular effort to keep the British out of the Euro and paddling in mid-Atlantic. Indeed there are those in Washington for whom the best way of weakening Europe would be for the British to leave altogether. The correct response to current American ‘shock and awe’ diplomacy aimed at Europe should not be to repair or construct new Atlantic institutions, but to strengthen European ones. What is true for Europe is equally true for China, India, Russia and Latin America.

Understanding what has led to the change in America attitudes will be crucial to salvaging something useable from the rubble of the ‘West’. Partly it is September 11<sup>th</sup>. Partly it is a story of changes in America’s politics, public affairs and the nature of its democracy, of shifting regional balances and the evolution of both Democrat and Republican Parties. Such is the richness and openness of American intellectual, if not political, debate that much can be learnt from the mouths of American analysts themselves. There has been so much concentration on the much-hyped work of Robert Kagan and his

‘American Strength and European Weakness’, that insufficient attention has been paid to the altogether more interesting work of Charles Kupchan, published in mid-2002, under the title ‘The End of the American Era’. This side-steps the usual rhetoric about unipolar versus multipolar worlds to argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union left America with a surfeit of power in its unipolar moment. This, he argues, it is squandering rather than using to construct a sympathetic multipolar environment for use when its current relative pre-eminence has declined. Such an analysis makes sense of the extraordinary aggressiveness of the US posture in recent months. The militarisation of US diplomacy and the domination of policy formation by cold-war hawks, can then be seen as nervousness about the continuation of hegemony rather than as a serene ascent to imperial status. Kupchan underlined the particular challenge for Europe in the *Financial Times* on 10<sup>th</sup> April “The European Union is currently in a no mans land. It is too strong to be Washington’s lackey but too weak and divided to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterweight”. Elsewhere he has argued that Europe will play Byzantium to America’s Western Roman Empire.

For other reasons, it is high time that Europeans grew out of the Atlantic glasses, which were appropriate for 1941 or 1981, but which no longer focus accurately in the world of the twenty first century. Both Europe and America are struggling to make sense of a world in which national sovereignty, even that shared amongst twenty-five nations, is inadequate to meet the universal challenges of a century beset by environmental degradation, human rights abuse and globally coordinated criminal and terrorist gangs. Globalisation has ripped apart much of the comfortable scenery of traditional international relations. Europeans seek to comfort themselves by replicating their own experience at global level, while Americans have moved recently from the assertion that almost no global governance was necessary, to one in which they argue that all the key decisions should be taken in the American interest, un-softened by the transmission mechanism of multilateral institutions. Neither worldview is looking particularly healthy in the aftermath of Iraq. The current gale of American enthusiasms may blow for some years yet, but Kupchan would argue that it is in the nature of America to lose interest in foreign entanglements, even imperial ones.

The world therefore needs to be looking for responses that address underlying universal challenges rather than passing personal pique. The world outside Washington needs to critically review the effectiveness of its existing multilateral institutions from the UN to the G8 and beyond, rather than defending them instinctively against ‘shock jock’ criticism be it from the Senate, the Fox Channel or the ‘take no prisoners’ school of US think tanks. The universal challenges impact equally on both Europe and America for both have imperial pasts which integrate them into global problems. Amongst many other examples which could be cited of using brilliant Americans to light the way forward, I would point to the work of environmental historian John McNeill. His book “Something New Under the Sun” demonstrates elegantly how ‘security anxiety’ in the mid twentieth century directly generated major disturbances in the environment, whose consequences the whole world will have to live with for many centuries. Similarly, the work of James Kurth on ‘Migration and the Dynamics of Empire’ richly illustrates the way that both Europe and America are changing in demographic terms. Each becoming two nations. One secular, rich old and feeble and the other Islamic or Latino, poor, young and robust. The debate about sovereignty needs not only to be rooted not just in our past, but to be projected forward into our futures.

**June 6<sup>th</sup>, Guildford, Surrey**

# **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

## **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 4**

### **“GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE”**

**- Yale Ferguson - Center for Global Change & Governance, Rutgers University**

Contemporary “globalization” has been multidimensional (e.g., economic, cultural, demographic, military, environmental) and has coexisted with national, regional, and local patterns.

“Governance” connotes influence or control over a range of issues or over particular issues.

By any measure then, governance involves a host of actors at many different overlapping and interacting “levels” in the global system—not just states and certainly not only at the “world” level. So governance involves states but also international organizations, less formal “regimes,” local jurisdictions of states (e.g., in the U.S., Texas and Virginia), TNCs, NGOs, tribes, families, religious entities, and so on. Viewed in that perspective, even a hyperpower/ empire/ superpower only “rules” at most some of what happens in the global system.

Models of governance at the global level: the United Nations and various other functional organizations (e.g., World Bank, IMF, WHO, WTO)—also hyperpower/ empire/ superpower. Current U.S. unilateralism contrasts with earlier and to some extent continuing trends of neoliberal globalization and post-Cold War multilateral ethos of peacekeeping, human rights, and environment. Nevertheless, many critics of “globalization” continue to equate globalization with Americanization, which exacerbates “clashes of civilizations” and anti-globalization generally.

On the one hand, we are increasingly aware that the nation-state as a model can no longer effectively address problems that are cross-boundary and even global in scope. On the other hand, the United States and a few other secondary-capacity “major powers” are resisting what many consider ought to be a new world order or are seeking to shape that order in accordance with their narrow conceptions of “national interest.”

Be that as it may, by no measure is the global system “anarchic,” except in the sense that there is no world government. It is “ordered” at many different levels.

The questions are:

How effective and “just” are prevailing patterns of global governance?

If to some extent they are inadequate and/or unjust, how best to reform them? Specifically, how best to respond to U.S. militant unilateralism: condemnation, acquiescence and cooperation, and/or regional countervailing institution-building and initiatives?

How best to revitalize global governance in terms of international organizations: overcome issues of bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of transparency, democratic deficit, and the like?

**June 4<sup>th</sup> 2003, Rutgers University, New Jersey**

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# NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

## BRIEFING PAPER NO. 5

### “THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ”

- **Oliver Sparrow** – Director, The Challenge Forum

The complexity of the world's affairs grows in parallel with its increased connectivity. Institutions will be needed to manage the new potential which this complexity creates, both within and between nations. We can hope that these structures will grow spontaneously, or we can set about their active design. Where there are serious blocks to institutional improvement within nations, or where systems have failed, then we may consider intervention. The bulk of this text consider what this entails.

#### *Classifying the agents*

The world of affairs contains many actors. We have been accustomed to think of these primarily in terms of nation states, but there are, of course, many forms of classification: by power, by affiliation, by numbers and in other ways. These many actors, new and traditional, which are being connected together by growth and new capabilities create new demands. In order to see the dimensions in which order needs to be generated, let us begin by considering some of the ways in which we can segment these actors.

- In the world of power blocks, US economic and military power is insuperable. It has no effective rivals and, given the facts of demographics, it is unlikely that any prospective configuration of the European Union could expect to meet it.
- In the world of ideas, the loose association of concepts around the idea of liberal democracy seems unlikely to be superseded by anything but a modified version of itself.
- In the world of the raw head count, the industrial powers and their populations will continue to be a shrinking minority of, on average, increasingly elderly and dependent people. The preponderance of people with technical training will, however, gradually shift to the lower income regions due to the facts of education and demographics.
- Commerce - and other forms of organisation which grow from roots other than location and precedent - will continue to develop different, distinctive centres of weight, of ownership and of accountability. The driver for this is specialisation and risk management, augmented by the extraordinary potential for IT-mediated data exchange. These forms of organisation will defer to other patterns of segmentation only where they must.
- National politics will undergo major changes in the way in which it must address its electorate. This will occur for two reasons. First, because the social divisions embalmed in the current brand of political parties are no longer the principle components around which societies vary. Second, decision-taking will be forced to recognise the existence of more voices with more detailed expertise beyond government than within it, the facts of there being engines of multi-layered scrutiny that have much bigger communication budgets than does central government, and the death of deference.

It is also plain that this world will be more complex by almost any measure. It will have more actors, see greater volumes of activity, possess more connectivity and access more knowledge used with greater confidence. There will be an unceasing drive to best practice, however defined, wherever there is open competition.

This situation would present a major challenge even if these forces were to be deployed with a framework of consensus. However, they are not. The world is heterogeneous and, despite the disappearance of ethnic dress and the seeming convergence of consumers on a world of malls, actually growing more plural and more dissected with each passing week.

### *The challenge*

Current developments are without historical precedent. Humanity has launched itself on an experiment which requires continual improvement and the management of the down-side if there is not to be a catastrophe, or set of catastrophes in the generations ahead. We do not know how to live with an educated, technified and militarised 8-9 billion.

There is one further, unavoidable fact about the world which we are creating. More agencies within it – more people, wider economic systems, sets of criteria, information sources and filters - are being connected together than ever before, or connected in richer ways and in more depth. This is occurring in a system which already suffers from something analogous to both high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis. The pressures will increase. So will the obstructions.

The components of any one part of this system have different rates of response to novel challenges. The response of economic structures and educated people is almost always much faster than institutional adaptation, even in the complex nations which are used to institutional redesign. Institutional response itself often outstrips social change, or may head off in a direction which is antithetical to the social trends of that time and place. The roots of rejectionism and religious fundamentalism grow from just such a situation.

The forces of change will cannot, however, be wished away. They are the composite outcome of many individual choices and the pursuit of liberty, of actions which are aimed to increase competitiveness in the ceaseless pursuit of best practice. The needs of the 8-9 billion people who will be living a generation hence can be met in a sustainable manner only through enormous increases in investment, efficiency and institutional competence.

The challenge is, therefore, how to organise the world to mitigate and manage these forces. Insofar as some aspects of the world – however dissected – will not reform themselves, it is inevitable that regulation and upgrade will, to some degree, need to be imposed. We have found that commerce does not usually self-regulate and the governments are needed to protect the commons. History shows us that corrupt, blocked or obscurantist regimes do not readily reform themselves. There is huge ignorance at the practical level as to how to build working structures within most middle income countries. There is a virtual absence of public debate about “who we want to become.” Nationalism or borrowed ideology tends to fill the resulting gap. There is, therefore, a major challenge as to how the agents of improvement are to enable the construction of institutions which are fit for purpose.

### *Notes towards a solution*

We forget – and superpowers tend to forget most profoundly of all - that the central institutions in any state are both tacit and intangible. Top-down designs will not do. Whatever structures are created need to harmonise with and seemingly arise from the patterns of discourse and transaction which characterise the social group which they represent. The outward patterns of anything new – mobile telephones, new democracy, consumerism – has to be embedded in the basic reflexes of the society if they are to work. This often happens in unaccountable ways. However, it is a science with which we have yet to grapple, and it is fair to say that “installing democracy” is not a meaningful military aim unless this comes with an expectation of a great deal of trial and error, name-calling and chronic civil unrest.

One can, of course, attempt to get the big issues right, and hope that “natural” institutions will follow. This is itself a long list, examples of which are the separation of powers, active management of corruption, rational allocation of resources, representative political systems at all levels of scale, fiscal and monetary probity, information transparency, access to credit, rural tenure and the like. There are all manner of desiderata in the private sector: openness to trade and external ideas, a thriving consumer culture and appropriate systems of accountability for management. There are natural targets for human capital, public health and security. Getting these issues “right” is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for progress, however.

Complex economies present a myriad of options. They erode the foundations of organisations which are not actively adaptive. They operate from a deep base of information. Complex institutions are required if these are to function. Warlordism and command-and-control are primitive social forms which are capable of managing only simple economies and simple societies. These forms always fail once a given level of complexity is achieved. Complex economies demand complex institutions. One cannot command an economy made up of self-willed professionals.

This fact has a profound implication for those who wish to improve the institutions of countries which operate below their potential, or to police the new connections which global integration creates. Capacity raising equates to attempts to install new, different machinery for managing increased complexity. *Such machinery aims both to deliver and to manages increased degrees of freedom in the system – what we call liberty, options, choice.* It is demonstrable that societies which possess these structures achieve economic and social growth, and that these which do not, will not:

- Assessments of Africa and Asian countries in the 1950s showed that their economies were broadly similar. However, they differed substantially in their institutional integrity and human potential. This difference proved a direct predictor of subsequent differences in performance. Incomes per capita across Africa and South-East Asia were almost identical in 1950, but typically differ by two orders of magnitude today. Non-communist Asian nations with exceptional institutional performance – for example, Singapore – succeeded spectacularly, whilst those which suffered institutional distractions, for example Indonesia or the Philippines, have done less well.
- Italian city states are shown to have differed in many ways before their eventual unification. Analysis shows that institutional strength of any one of these states in the middle of the C19<sup>th</sup> is a good predictor of differential standards of living today, and serves as a sound predictor of their relative economic performance between 1980 and 2000.
- The World Bank has a well tried index of human capital which includes many features – for example measuring access to fresh water, literacy, the integrity of financial, legal and political institutions, economic inequality, female participation in education and labour and so forth. It is widely used in the development literature. This index is extremely closely allied to the level of economic development of the society in question. One should read this not to say that rich countries are kind to their citizens, but that any state which does not develop its human and institutional potential will not get rich or complex. Indexes which assess tax evasion, corruption, levels of economic risk and instability are also inversely related to the level of wealth in a nation. Once again, this is not to say that rich nations are innately stable and honest, but that a given level of complexity can only be reached once these issues have been resolved.

It is not possible to impose solutions of this sort; or anyway to do so on the basis of current understanding. Intervention may well be required in the most urgent and egregious cases. However, military power will always be an enabling secondary force, much as civil policing works on behalf of more abstract forms of organisation. The order: “Sergeant, install democracy” is not an option.

Intervention, where it is effective, uses “all modes” power projection. That is, it delivers pressure to adapt, guidance on adaptation, support where there is weakness and – above all – affords or helps the emergence of a paradigm of that towards which the society is struggling. It helps a nation discuss what kind of country it wishes to be.

This is, of course, a major feat of organisation where it is achieved. It requires allies to act in a deep, co-ordinated manner, one that is not to be distracted by set-backs nor blown off course by surface issues. It needs to know its own mind, and to be prepared for the long haul. What it plainly is not is a short-term, project focused or contentious activity; and neither is it meaningful if subject to the nominal authority of institutions for which its partners have no fundamental respect. Organisation is, therefore, a major challenge to the superpower’s ambitions in this regard, with or without partners.

It is not easy to see how this clarity of resolve is to be achieved. Independent interests are at stake. These will continue to bias attitudes, as was evident from the actions of the creditor nations in the Iraq war. The European Union is trying to acquire the mantle of unified, global power. Whilst its economic and social “numbers” sum to those of the US, its capabilities and its potential do not. There is, already, friction between the powers on issues of style, trade and regional authority. Exacerbated rivalry between these two blocks is a danger which is most likely to become significant in a world of slowed economic growth, with a soft Euro compensating for slow productivity improvement. There is reason to expect just such an outcome in the decade ahead.

The post-war, cold war institutions such as the UN are also a poor mechanism through which to carry this project forward. An innate assumption of formal, nominally-democratic agencies is that its rules are universal, its sanctions triggered automatically and its justice blind. This assumption is not realistic or viable in the international arena. The major parties will not be bound to “international law”, such

that their possession of nuclear weapons is placed on a level with that of an erratic dictatorship. Equally, what is apposite in respect of Iraq is not, in the real world, applicable to a major power such as China, despite its 50 million political prisoners, environmental degradation and weapons of mass destruction.

The alternative, in which difficult issues are discussed and developed *in camera* amongst allies, also presents difficulties. Its legitimacy is extremely suspect in the eyes of the rest of the world. Equally, it is easy to come to believe that one's own interests are universal, as was evident in the latter decades of the British Empire.

The world is confronted with a period in which accelerated institutional growth is essential. There will be situations where the future of many millions are plainly blocked by active opposition to this, and the temptation to intervene will be strong.

The challenge to this is, essentially, threefold.

- We do not know how, technically, to create complex institutions on behalf of client states.
- We do not know how to manage the unity of our ambitions in this regard. We do not have the machinery to make rational choices, or to understand the level of necessary commitment.
- We do not know how to create the institutions which will confer legitimacy and wise guidance on these actions.

The scale of any commitment is potentially very large. The former Yugoslavia, Iraq and nations such as Liberia and Ruanda will require care that lasts for decades. Even if one accepts the need for occasional intervention, and for systematic policy which is aimed at institutional upgrade in all nations, it is plainly impossible to meet all potential commitments. It is, therefore, close to self-evident that many parts of the world will fail to make an economic and social transition to match the inevitable strains of their demographic processes.

Billions live below their potential today – factually, there must be potential Einsteins sorting through rubbish and Beethovens begging on the street. A billion people live on less than a US dollar a day. Aside from these moral demands, however, facts compel a change of style. Some 2.5 billion graduates will be alive in 2020, by no means all of them living in the old industrial world. Their arrival bring both the potential for positive developments – and increased competitive erosion, and accelerate change - but also increased friction if their aspirations are not met. Extremely dangerous technologies are abroad, and the barriers to accessing these will continue to fall. Biotechnologies, in particular, have destructive potential when put into the wrong hands, or when in sloppily-managed hands. The living environment will not support 8-9 billion at current economic levels, let alone when foreseeable economic growth occurs. We shall need a community of the rational and the adaptive when we come to solve these issues.

**May 30<sup>th</sup> 2003, London**

# NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

## BRIEFING PAPER NO. 6

### “THE CHALLENGE OF PROMOTING A CULTURE OF PEACE IN A POST-IRAQ WORLD”

- **Johannah Bernstein** – Environmental Law Consultant

“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” (*Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO, 1945*)

#### *Redefining Security*

In the past, conventional security policy was based on the assumption that security problems were derived from the actions of other states. As such, it was typically believed that security threats should be solved militarily on a national basis. The conventional security approach has been about preserving state sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity. However, this approach has a number of shortcomings: it ignores the underlying reasons for conflict; it consumes resources and neglects the various forms of non-violent conflict resolution. As well, this statist and militarist approach to security may also induce insecurity in other states, not too mention engendering other hostilities.

The 1995 UN Conference on Social Development affirmed that real security can only be attained by reducing spending on arms and systematically redirecting those resources to meet critical human and environmental needs. It asserted that real defence is about making people stronger by meeting their basic human needs, and that security is not just about the absence of threats but about the presence of basic human needs such as food, water, shelter, access to education, and sanitation.

The definition of security is no longer limited to military might but extends to a more comprehensive definition encompassing economic strength, internal cohesion, food security, energy security, a clean environment, equality before law and good governance all form part of the emerging comprehensive security approach.

#### *The Root Causes of a Culture of Violence*

Fostering a new sense of global interdependence and a mindset of hope can only be achieved if the international community seriously addresses the root causes that underlie the culture of violence, which pervades the world. Some of these causes include: (i) the violence of economic and social deprivation; (ii) the flagrant asymmetries of wealth and opportunity within and between societies; (iii) colonialism, exploitation and domination; (iv) poverty and social injustices such as exclusion and discrimination; (v) the banalisation of violence in the media; (vi) trafficking in arms and drugs; and (vii) the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### *Beyond the Absence of Threats to a Culture of Peace*

The 2000 UN Declaration on a Culture of Peace affirms in its Preamble that peace is not only the absence of violence, war or conflict, but requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation.” Article 1 of that Declaration defines a culture of peace as a “set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life” that promote the peaceful settlement of conflict, the quest for mutual understanding, and which enable individuals to live harmoniously with each other and the larger community of life. This language is also reflected in Principle 16 of the Earth Charter.

A culture of peace does not imply a society devoid of any form of conflict. Conflict itself is a core fact of social existence and indeed present in every type of social relationship. The culture of peace means that societies and their members deal with conflict in the spirit of cooperation, integration, transformation, and mutual adaptation, using the tools of collaborative and creative problem-solving, rather than resort to violence and war.

The goal of a culture of peace is therefore a world in which the rich diversity of cultures is cause for appreciation and cooperation, rather than a source of social despair, disintegration, violent conflict and war.

**June 4<sup>th</sup> 2003, Brussels**

# **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

## **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7**

### **“CONFLICTING U.S. AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER: ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND SECURITY”**

**- Hugo Paemen** – formerly Head of EU Mission, Washington DC

During my term as E.U. Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, which ended towards the year 2000, I was regularly asked to comment on the state of the relations between the U.S. and Europe. In doing so, I always started or ended by stressing the fundamental common values and principles that were at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance and which at the end of the day remained the determining factors of our relationship. Of course, I had to go through the series of so-called irritants in the trade sector, with the bananas, the hormone enhanced meat, the G.M.O.'s, and other niceties. But, as an Ambassador is expected to do, I tried to put the persisting mutual misunderstandings and preconceptions in their right context and perspective and I untiringly expressed my hope and confidence that reason and the sense of solidarity would continue to prevail.

My hunch is that those speeches would rather sound out-of-date today. Already in 1999 the Nixon Center in Washington published a study on “Trends in U.S. – European Relations” under the foreboding title “Drifting Apart”, but which was at that time still followed by a question mark. Bookcases full of literature on the same subject have been published since then. And, of course, the question mark has disappeared for quite a while. The phenomenon is not contested, the discussion is rather about its inevitability, its impact on both sides and the indispensable adjustments that will have to be made. A not unimportant American official has already intimated a European-wide sell-off, separating the “new” from the “old” parts of the legacy.

Of all that has been written and said what can we consider to be the basic facts and what are the perceptions? Among the decisive facts that have influenced the U.S. – European relationship recently are undoubtedly:

- the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of the U.S. as sole superpower,
- the further development of the European integration with the creation of the Euro, the E.U.'s Enlargement and the start of its Common Foreign and Security Policy,
- the U.S. – E.U. partnership in the Balkans,
- the disagreements on a solution for the Middle-East crisis, and most eminently
- the events of September 11 and their aftermath.

It is remarkable that nearly all these events belong to the “security” or geo-political side of the relationship. Does this mean that the time of the banana war and the G.M.O. disputes is over? Or rather that the new issues are of such compelling importance that the once predominant trade fights have been dwarfed? Have the security battalions taken over from the trade warriors? Because even more remarkable is the gap that seems to exist between, on the one hand, the developments in the economic sector and, on the other hand, the security areas.

In a study, published a couple of weeks ago, on “The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy” Joseph P. Quinlan from Johns Hopkins University writes: “One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the past decade has been the increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between Europe and America than between any other two continents.” Some of the many facts from the study show not only that both are each other's major trading and investment partner, but:

- both continents are each other's most important market in terms of global earnings
- in 2000 roughly 58% of corporate America's foreign assets were located in Europe and European firms accounted for more than two thirds of total foreign assets in the U.S.
- about 7 million Americans owe their livelihoods to European investors; the corresponding European figure is 6 million.

The general thrust of his findings is that in the past decade “the transatlantic economy became even more intertwined and interdependent”.

In contrast to this, It goes without explanation that the relations in the security area have developed in a different direction, at least with some countries and with a large part of the European public opinion. But let’s go back to the most recent developments on either side.

In 2000, as I mentioned before, the European Union introduced the Euro as common currency. This made the economic integration quasi irreversible. The three Member States of the E.U. that have stayed out will probably join in the near future. There was some skepticism and even some suspicion in the U.S. when the idea of a European currency was launched. This has now disappeared and the Euro is being treated as a normal international currency.

The next natural step in the European integration process is considered to be the establishment of a real Common Foreign and Security Policy. In that context the decision had already been taken to deploy a military force of 50 000-60 000 people capable of performing humanitarian and rescue tasks as well as peacekeeping and certain peacemaking tasks. As their first mission the Union forces have taken over the reins of peacekeeping mission “Operation Allied Harmony” from NATO. Matters of collective defense, however, are left to NATO, of which most E.U. countries are members. It has to be said that, although it was an indispensable part of the initial concept of the European integration, the idea of a common foreign and defense policy was only gradually, and even somewhat reluctantly developed.

On the enlargement of the Union, negotiations have been finalized aiming at the accession of 10 new countries to the Union in 2004. That will bring its population close to 500 million. This is more than the populations of US + Canada + Japan + Australia + New Zealand together. I mention this only to give an idea of the Immense challenge this phase of the European integration implies.

In light of these fundamental developments and the challenges involved, the Governments of the Union have organized a Convention, which has been asked to formulate recommendations in order to increase the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the governance of the larger Union.

Nobody will deny that with all this Europe has taken on a full plate of its own recently and that, inevitably, its collective energy has been mainly devoted to the intricacies of one of the most decisive phases of the integration process.

On its side, the new American administration, which took over in 2000, had openly announced that its foreign policy would be more consistently focused on the national interest. As Condoleezza Rice wrote: “...it will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.” This led, in the early stages, to the renunciation of some multilateral agreements already in force or in the process of ratification (Kyoto Agreement, A.B.M. Agreement, Court of International Justice...). The implementation of the new foreign policy was in the hands of what was generally considered to be a “dream team”, perceived somewhat in contrast with the economic team, which would anyhow be totally replaced after only some months in office.

On the foreign trade side, the American government was instrumental, with the E.U. and others, in launching the new multilateral negotiations of the World Trade Organization in Doha. Congress gave the administration the authority to negotiate a global agreement. On the bilateral side, and in accordance with some campaign promises, the administration introduced a considerable increase of its farm subsidies and applied safeguard measures to protect the steel industry.

However, the dominating events during the last two years were undoubtedly the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and the subsequent American policy shake-up in the context of the war against terrorism. After the worldwide wave of sympathy and solidarity, reactions to the subsequent U.S. policy became more divisive in the world and more particularly in Europe. Within the U.S., somewhat inevitably, the focus on homeland security and on weapons of mass destruction has strengthened even more the fundamental priority given to the pursuit and defense of the national interest.

### *How deep is the gap?*

Without going into the circumstances and deeper causes of the Atlantic divorce following the 9/11 events, it is worthwhile trying to understand whether the growing divide has been caused by irreversible forces, inevitable outside developments or whether it is the logical consequence of consciously taken options based on divergent views of a changing world. .

There are those who believe that the growing inequality of power, which they equate to military power, inevitably widens the gap between the two partners of the Atlantic Community. This theory says that a stronger U.S. will, quite naturally and inevitably, always want to fully exercise its power in a world where strength is the unique decisive yardstick between nations. Similarly and as inevitably, the weaker Europeans try to hedge their weakness by invoking rules or by concluding international agreements. How do those pundits explain that this anomaly has not appeared more openly before? Because, they say, the Cold War and the protective shield of NATO, essentially provided for by the U.S., made it possible for Europeans to build a kind of paradise based on idealistic but somewhat illusive concepts like international law, multilateral agreements, human rights, etc. These commentators have a tendency to consider the European Union as the apex of fairyland playing funny girls' games and having even invented their own funny currency. Evidently, they consider that, in the new world order, this asymmetrical development can not go on much longer, if only because of the irrepressible need for the superpower to exercise his muscles in order to secure its eminence in a world of macho states.

The reality is probably somewhat different. But it does not mean that the concept of the rock-solid Atlantic Alliance, as it survived the skirmishes of the Cold War, is not being seriously challenged by the geo-political shifts that have taken place during the last fifteen years. Successive NATO summit meetings have wrestled with the seemingly irreconcilable requirements of the preservation, adaptation and enlargement of the Alliance. It is also far from clear what the role of an "adapted" NATO can be in the context of the new national security strategy of the U.S.. Sometimes it looks like preordained as a reservoir for possible ad hoc coalition-building wherever national interests are threatened. As Donald Rumsfeld said: the mission determines the coalition, not the reverse. As the present administration prepares the country for continuous leadership in the world based upon military superiority and balance of power between the major countries, some Europeans also ask themselves what in that scheme the role of the E.U. would be beyond that of a loyal NATO "dishwasher", the real menu nor the guests at the meal having been disclosed.

On the other hand, it is also far from clear how prepared the Member States of the E.U. are to do what is needed for the establishment of a credible European military force that could really be in charge of the European home security as well as become what was once called the European pillar of the enlarged Alliance. As I said before, the building of a European defense capacity was always considered to come at the end of the economic and political integration process. The recent developments will increase the pressure on the governments to add this dimension more clearly to the enormous challenge of the enlargement and institutional reform of the Union. But they will have to deliver more than plans if they want to convince the U.S. and the rest of the world of their strategic role and be considered as relevant interlocutors and reliable partners.

### *Is there room for compromise?*

Answers to these questions would in the first place presuppose that Europe and the U.S. can work out a concept and a "modus vivendi" of coexistence between two different views of the future world order. It is indeed unlikely that the European Union will ever, or at least in the foreseeable future, and this notwithstanding its relative economic, political and possible military weight, join the military competition in the world. The whole culture that led to the constitution of the Union, fed by the experiences of internecine wars, has been dominated by the concept of a community of law. It is unrealistic to think that in its external relations the Union would not try to gradually apply the same basic principles. This would imply a fundamental change in the history of international relations (as the E.U. has introduced already as far as its own member states are concerned). The only context in which this is possible is the system of the United Nations, which has excluded the use of force as a legal way to settle international conflicts short of situations of self-defense in compliance with existing rules. It does not exclude competition between nations but would subject all international exchanges to a legal

system of multilateral rules. There are the schools of the realists and the neo-realists who, evidently, will look down with skeptical sympathy on these naïve “Kantian” visions.

The position of the U.S. on this issue will be decisive. Its monopoly of military power allows it to satisfy the requirements of a global strategic reach. But solitary action has become difficult in a unifying world and politically risky. Even if this unique position of strength can be maintained in the foreseeable future, it will encourage others to look for recognition based on the same standards and using the same elements of power. With the transfer of technology becoming increasingly fluid, monopolistic positions will be more and more short-lived. One does not need to be a doom-sayer to predict that without a genuine effort to curtail the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction every country in the world that wants to do so will soon dispose of such weapons. But only the United States is in a position today to launch a credible process not to stop the technology, which is already there, not to reserve their use to some privileged and self-designated countries, which will not be accepted by the others, but to gradually come to a system of rules that will be applicable to everybody and monitored and enforced by a credible authority. This authority, according to the Europeans, can only come, in one way or another, from the United Nations, where the U.S. is unmistakably the key player.

All this does not mean that Europe will give up its military ambitions and its reach for hard power. Nor should other nations do so. What many Europeans would like to see is that this moment of unique economic and military power of the Western world, and of the United States in particular, be used to establish some basic rules of the global game, based on the universal values they represent, and have them accepted and enforced by the world community so that they will survive a possible change in the relative balance of power, which is never to be excluded (if not for our children, perhaps for our grandchildren). They will only have some chance of success, though, if the effort is genuine and if their promoters themselves are ready to respect the rules. It was Dr. Henri Kissinger, in his role of historian, who wrote: “The test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms, That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times”.

The globalization of the world has already led to a considerable increase of international agreements and arrangements at the governmental and non-governmental level. This is particularly the case between the U.S. and Europe as a consequence of the increasing integration of the two societies. These networks are not the result of the growing military power of the United States. They have rather expanded in the non-military sector, particularly since the strengthening of the E.U., as appears from the study by Joseph Quinlan I mentioned before. This also shows an interesting relationship between the so-called soft and hard power nations can exert. As there is no doubt that good diplomacy backed by some hard power capacity will be more effective, it is wrong to think that both are mutually supportive in all circumstances. It is easy to recall examples where too much or abuse of hard power has led to a less efficient diplomacy, as there are many examples of deficient diplomacy leading to military conflicts that could have been avoided.

Between the U.S. and the E.U. a wide framework of consultations has been set up since the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995. The general feeling is that it did not deliver what had been hoped for. It has been working well in the trade sector for quite some time, with ups and downs, notwithstanding the objective differences of interest in certain areas. It has also worked well in other sectors like certain aspects of the war against terrorism. But there is no doubt that the recent experience will lead to some thinking on both sides about how things went as wrong as they did and how this can be avoided in the future, if that is what they want, a goal that I would wholeheartedly endorse.

**April 7<sup>th</sup> 2003, Speech delivered Madison, Wisconsin,  
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES:  
CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

**BRIEFING PAPER NO. 8  
“DECISION MAPPING & IRAQ”**

**- Richard Hodapp** – The Mapping Alliance Inc.

The applications of "Decision Mapping" process technology at policy levels of Governments, and Industry continue. Each project reminds us that real success is - and always has been driven by people making and effecting great decisions.

Hans-Peter Duerr tells me "All of nature is decision based ... a hint of why evolution as we believe it occurred would have been impossible". I am still flat on my back pondering that.

If the patterns in Mapping are true, then the future state of Iraq is decision based, and multiple scoped. And it is worth some time and energy to define what those decisions are.

It is possible to avoid being consumed by the grab for power, the pull to install familiar but inappropriate infrastructure, and even to stay above the seduction of available funding. So before we apply resources, defining the decisions to effect remains a worthwhile idea.

**June 9<sup>th</sup> 2003, Miami**



## **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

### **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 9**

#### **“HAMILTON, MONNET, FEDERALISM AND GLOBAL SOLUTIONS”**

**- John Pinder** – Federal Trust; former President, Union of European Federalists

Hamilton and the other American Founding Fathers invented the idea of government at two levels: one for the common affairs of a group of states, the other for the particular affairs of each of the states. This could work only if the governments at each level were democracies based on the rule of law. Monnet showed how this federal principle could be applied by a group of modern nation-states, starting with the European Coal and Steel community in 1952 as a first step in the federation of Europe. The EU has indeed come a long way towards a federal system by steps and stages: establishing a federal judiciary and quasi-federal legislature and executive; acquiring major powers in the fields of the economy and environment together with a substantial external role relating to soft security; and expanding from six member states to fifteen, soon twenty-five, and then doubtless thirty and more. This has taken over half a century. But much has been achieved and relations among the member states have changed radically for the better.

It is natural that Europeans who have experienced this process should favour the strengthening of multilateral institutions in the wider world and will continue to work towards this end. But I would go further and suggest that the EU seek to apply federal principles among a vanguard group which could, as the EU has done in Europe, increasingly apply federal principles and expand toward universal membership. This would doubtless take longer, perhaps much longer, than the half-century the EU has taken to date. But it should meanwhile likewise both achieve much and radically improve relations among a growing number of member states.

Climate change, with related sustainable development, appears to be the most suitable field in which to start, rather than the global economy where there are already entrenched and powerful institutions, or defence which is the citadel of national sovereignty. Action to cut carbon emissions by over half in the next few decades is evidently required, with much more radical measures than the Kyoto Protocol, implying a need for embryonic federal institutions including the rule of law with respect to the use of fossil fuels, together with support for carbon sinks and for sustainable development of third-world countries through eco-friendly means of production. The members must be pluralist democracies and must, in order to have a sufficiently substantial impact on climate change, include at least one major power with an advanced economy as well as one with a less-developed economy, as a basis for expansion towards universal membership. Since the US is evidently not available for such a commitment and China lacks the democratic characteristics for such a system, the EU and India are both essential founder members of a global community for sustainable development; and it would be desirable to include as many other democracies as possible, while offering association to states that do not join.

To be prepared to proceed at first without the participation of the US, as a great democracy and great power which is also a great consumer of fossil fuels, may seem questionable. But perhaps a British participant is better placed than most to explain a need to do so, since Britain stood aside from the foundation of the first European community and consequently did not join until two decades later; and the EC/EU with all its benefits would hardly have got off the ground had the founder members failed to start without the British. It may also be observed that it is in the interests of the US to have a strong partner such as the EU with the capacity to act as a pillar of soft security in the world and thus do much to provide global solutions to global problems; and that a global community for sustainable development could provide a notable example of such a solution, to the benefit of the US as well as all other states.

The EU would have to undertake a major and sustained effort of both external and internal policy to prepare the launching of a project of this scope. It should be an enormously rewarding endeavour.



## **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

### **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 10**

#### **“EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER – PARTNER OR COUNTERWEIGHT TO AMERICA?”**

**- Sascha Müller-Kraenner** – Director for Europe and North America, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Berlin

Should Europe be a partner or a counterweight to the U.S. in global and regional security matters? This would be asking the wrong question. A security partnership between Europe and the U.S. – or as the Americans tend to label it, “a partnership in leadership” – can only be based on Europe’s capability to provide a counterweight if necessary. This necessity will be defined by Europe’s interests and a European security philosophy that continues to differ from the American approach.

Europe has become a partner of the U.S. in the global trade system. Both partners together serve as the motor of the World Trade Organization, WTO. Third parties such as China or coalitions of smaller countries can block decisions in the WTO. However, no progress can be achieved when Europe and the U.S. have not agreed on a common negotiating platform in advance. Europe and the U.S. have different interests and represent different regulatory philosophies in the global trade system. However, with the WTO both partners have agreed on a common framework of governance for this policy area.

France and Germany have built a solid partnership inside of the European Union. In the post-World War II period, both countries decided to balance their opposing economic and political interests by pushing for European integration. France and Germany have been true partners in leadership. The post-war deal between both countries was renewed and deepened with the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of both a Political Union and the Economic and Monetary Union. The much-acclaimed “friendship” between Germany and France is not based on similar interests, but on a voluntaristic decision to push ahead with European integration. Ultimately, the European project has served both countries’ domestic as well as foreign policy interests – as different as these may be. The inclusion of other EU member states – Poland could be such a case – into the Franco-German partnership in leadership will be possible only if based on a similar voluntaristic act.

After the U.S.-European rift on Iraq, the transatlantic security relationship needs to be redefined. This redefinition should not involve the mere duplication of Europe’s post-war security dependency on the U.S. Europe should ask itself how its own security interests – including different interests of member states with different historical experiences and perspectives – can be guaranteed by a new governance structure in which Europe has a decisive say. To redefine the U.S. role and mandate in Europe, we need to have an honest transatlantic conversation on our differing threat analyses and the instrumentaria that we have in mind to counter those threats.

It is obvious that, before September 11, both Europe and the U.S. underestimated the threat presented by terrorist activities possessing a global reach. In the U.S., the even larger threat of a combination of terrorist methods with weapons of mass destruction has been widely discussed since the early 1990s. The European debate has largely neglected this issue. However, the subordination of other threats as well as crucial regional and international security issues to the “war against terrorism,” as proposed by the new U.S. National Security Strategy, runs counter to European policy priorities. Regional conflicts – such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and conflicts in the Kashmir region and the Horn of Africa – cannot be subsumed under the issue of terrorism. The greater security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are all consequences of phenomena that involve change at a global level. Climate change, resource depletion and migration from economic and ecological disaster zones are some of the more pressing examples of these types of new threats. Our conversation with the U.S. must start with the question of how we analyze and prioritize threats.

Most of today’s threats and conflicts are of an asymmetric character. Increased military capabilities do not always provide an answer to them. Therefore, the future of Europe’s Security and Defense Policy

does not lie in creating an expensive U.S.-style global intervention force, but in the development of instruments and capabilities for civil and policy-based intervention. Strengthening international law and working toward a more just economic globalization will provide the framework for countering today's asymmetric threats with a new set of mainly non-military instruments.

However, Europe's military will continue to be needed and must therefore be modernized and re-oriented toward the new threats as described above. In the long term, this must lead to the creation of a common European army, instead of the 25 national armies of an enlarged Europe. Steps toward this vision, such as a European Procurement Agency, have recently been proposed by Germany and France. Europe must also modernize part of its military equipment, such as its air transport and reconnaissance capabilities. Europe's commitment to regional and global stability must grow, both politically as well as financially. Those stability costs will contain a military budget that fulfills Europe's security needs. However, an increase in military spending alone will not be the answer.

Europe must invest politically as well as financially in international security and governance structures. Our focus must be to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to be a more relevant forum for decisions on global security issues as well as for operational tasks in conflict prevention, crisis management and nation-building. To achieve that mission, the EU must acquire a unified voice inside the UN.

The post-war reconstruction of Iraq and the surrounding region will provide a test case for Europe's ability to project its interests as well as its capabilities to provide assistance via the UN. If the UN is to play a strong role in post-war Iraq, this role cannot be based on a belated legitimization of the U.S.-led war. Europe's commitment to help the Iraqi people and to transform the region into a more democratic place must go beyond the provision of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, Europe should not subsidize a U.S.-led military administration. The UN – with key support from the EU – must have a leading role in the political, economic and societal reconstruction of Iraq. The political room for this role must be created in – probably difficult – negotiations with the U.S. and in an ongoing conversation with the Iraqi opposition.

## **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

### **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 11**

#### **“THE POST WESTPHALIAN STATE SYSTEM AND UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES”**

**- Donald J. Devine** – Bellevue University

Since the post-Westphalian state system has been our history, it has meaning for us, although even Henry Kissinger recently wrote about it in a more-or-less romantic manner. But the question of a universalistic challenge is much less comprehensible. Does one mean the United Nations, the international treaty system, globalization (if so is it economic, environmental, human rights or terrorist?), the on-going internationalization of democracy, the world community or all of the above? After a review of these possibilities, the author argues it is possible to conclude there is not much of a universal challenge from any or all—if so many different things even can be considered a universal challenge.

So it is necessary to go back and look closely at the post-Westphalian regime and understand what it did and did not do—and what provided stability and order, if anything did at all during its long period of rule.

In its current manifestation, one is led to investigate the idea of an American empire becoming the center of a future state system. This must be viewed historically, during the Cold War and in the light of its support in the U.S. today. One must look closely at the specific case of the war with Iraq, especially its moral and legal justification in the U.S. homeland and how that must inevitably conflict with the reality on the ground. The limitation of democracy in Iraq has already begun, and we can see how ideals, resources and rhetoric in the U.S. have shifted in response. A close review of these matters reveals many reasons to suspect that there will not be an American empire.

Most of those who would respond positively to this result will be disappointed in what will actually happen to the poor old world as a consequence. Nation states will continue to be the world players (with the U.S. the dominant one), trade will continue to be the major unifying force, the U.N. will remain pretty much as it is, there will be occasional atrocities, and poverty, the environment, terrorism, war, unrest and the rest will continue to be with us, while redistribution will not. That is, the world will remain post-Westphalian, only more so.

Or perhaps a bit less so, as is suggested by a few modest suggestions that are offered, mostly stolen from Coral Bell and Secretary Kissinger, not much of which will be especially consoling to many looking forward to universal solutions.



## NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ

### BRIEFING PAPER NO. 12 “THE AFTERMATH OF WAR”

- **Sir Timothy Garden** – Visiting Professor at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London

The rapid military victory by American, British and Australian combat forces, with limited support from a few other nations, has left a wider reconstruction task than just rebuilding Iraq. The diplomatic damage in the run up to the war has caused deep divisions between old allies. These rifts were reinforced as nations decided on whether to give tangible support to the military operation. Now in the post-conflict phase, disagreements have simmered over the role of international institutions in the work of nation building in Iraq. Yet the need for a coherent international approach has rarely been more important. The threat from al-Qaeda-linked terrorism remains. The Middle East is still an area of potential future conflict. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a problem, particularly as North Korea throws off international restraints. In looking for paths to renewed co-operation between old allies, the United Nations and the European Union must both play a part in mending fences.

#### *The United Nations*

When the historians look back at the past year, they may conclude that the tactical success in bringing the UN into the debate over a war in Iraq was a strategic mistake. The diplomatic process, which eventually achieved a unanimous Security Council vote for UNSCR 1441, encouraged many to believe that the UN was back in the driving seat for dealing with Iraq. But President Bush had also made it clear that he believed: *"the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted."*

The United States was impatient for decisive action; the United Kingdom wanted UN authority for military action; Germany and France led the call for more time for the inspection process. The attempt to achieve a further resolution to give authority for military action was unsuccessful. Hard bargaining by the US failed to achieve the necessary 9 votes, and in any event it was clear that France would exercise a veto if necessary. The US and UK opted to use UNSCR 1441, and previous resolutions on Iraq, as their authority for military action.

This failure of diplomacy has had a series of unfortunate consequences. In the USA, antipathy towards the UN has increased. In answer to President Bush's question on the future of the UN, many in his Administration had their beliefs in its irrelevance confirmed. Although unexpected countries like Canada and Mexico had taken a tough stand in the Security Council, the real anger was directed at France and Germany. Both American and British politicians chose to use anti-French feelings in the run up to the conflict as a way to deflect public interest from the issue of whether military action was legitimate. Russia has also remained unconvinced by the rush to war. Questions about the legitimacy of the intervention are increasing as the weapons of mass destruction continue to prove elusive.

However, the UN has a major role in legitimising whatever form of government emerges. It must eventually verify that weapons of mass destruction are no longer there. It can draw on its expertise for dealing with humanitarian needs, making the battlefields safe, and encouraging the involvement of non-governmental organisations. The near unanimous agreement by the Security Council on UNSCR 1483 on 22 May 2003 is perhaps the first sign that the international community is ready to move forward together in a more coherent way over Iraq, whatever the previous differences.

## *The European Union*

While leaders were falling out in New York, the European Union managed to have a more refined dispute. The Greek Presidency, Javier Solana and Chris Patten had all made clear the EU's support for a diplomatic rather than early military solution to Iraq. Yet the embryonic common foreign and security policy mechanism could do little to paper over the wide division between its members. The UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal were strongly supportive of the US push for military action. At the end of January, their leaders, together with those of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, signed a joint note for the Wall Street Journal expressing their unity. France, Germany, and Belgium were strongly against a rush to war.

In a more complex set of divisions, the prospective new members of the EU were brought into the dispute. The declared coalition of 44 countries supporting military action was Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States and Uzbekistan. This gave rise to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's unfortunate characterisation of a division between "Old Europe", represented by France and Germany, and "New Europe" drawn from grateful eastern European states. President Chirac added fuel to the flames by suggesting that pro-US candidate countries were "badly brought up", and hinting that their EU membership applications might need reviewing.

EU optimists hope that the crisis over Iraq policy will promote a greater push for developments towards coherent European foreign policy positions. Some small hopeful signs emerged even during this turbulent period. The EU took over the modest but important task in Macedonia from NATO on 1 April 2003. If this goes well, there is an expectation in the longer term that the EU will progressively take on the Balkans task, although this is now looking more problematic. Despite the megaphone diplomacy between the UK and France over Iraq, some reinforcement of their joint push for a more serious European defence capability has been seen during the meeting between Blair and Chirac at Le Touquet in early February.

Pessimists however point to the lack of progress in providing the new military capabilities which Europe needs. After the initial rush of enthusiasm to allocate standing forces to the Helsinki Headline Goal process, little seems to have happened to provide extra funds for the missing enabling capabilities. The latest agreement to go ahead with procuring 180 A400M transport aircraft is a very small step. Iraq has also taken its toll in highlighting the divisions over a key foreign and security policy issue. At the end of April, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held an exclusive summit to look at how they might develop EU defence capability. Their proposal for an independent planning headquarters deepened suspicions that this was an initiative designed to separate the Europeans from NATO.

It is too early to judge how important these different strands will be in the longer term. There is an opportunity for the EU to use the Convention on the future of Europe to move forward in the defence and security policy area. Few believe that progress will be rapid or coherent. Despite the strong rhetorical support from some parts of Europe for the US strategy in Iraq, only the UK and Poland provided any military capability. For the operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the overwhelming fighting capability was provided by the US. There is a danger that many European nations may decide that they can get by in any future coalition operations with support on a level with Micronesia and the Solomon Islands. This will not be good for the future of the EU.

## *NATO*

The diplomatic machinations over Iraq were also bruising for NATO. Afghanistan had shown the future: the US expects to lead coalitions of the willing. In any event, there would have been little chance of consensus among member states over mounting a NATO operation. Even with a sidelined role, the divisions between the various national players managed to cause excitement. NATO found itself in difficulties over authorisation for planning for the defence of Turkey in the event of a conflict in Iraq. The diplomatic temperature rose as France, Germany and Belgium saw themselves being pressured into giving a stamp of approval for US early moves on Iraq. To general surprise, Turkey in the end did not allow ground operations to be launched against Iraq from its territory. There were no

attacks by Iraq on Turkey. Nevertheless, the concern in NATO was real, and the public name calling between members was undoubtedly damaging.

While injured feelings will doubtless heal with time, Iraq reinforced questions about the future relevance of NATO. The Alliance has had a remarkable success over the past decade in the way that it has stabilised the Balkans. It has also done great work in its programme of enlargement, which has brought greater stability to Europe. Yet, NATO is still working to its 1999 strategic concept, which looks dated in the light of recent events. The US produced its national security strategy in September 2002 in the light of the new threats from terrorism and proliferation. Yet few relish the thought of the arguments that would arise in any attempt to update the Alliance concept.

At Prague last year, the commitments by member states to a new NATO Response Force seemed to be accepting that the Alliance needed to be able to spearhead high intensity operations in distant parts at short notice. NATO is already working well beyond its traditional area of interest. The stabilisation force in Afghanistan has been drawing on NATO support for the joint German-Dutch leadership. Despite the differences over Iraq, members have agreed that NATO should take over this ISAF commitment for the longer term. Afghanistan remains a problem, and a force of 5000 in Kabul is inadequate to promote the rule of law throughout the country. This could be a task for a much enlarged NATO peacekeeping force in the longer term. As Poland looks for backers in its bid to join the US and the UK in providing security within Iraq, the obvious solution is to draw on NATO capabilities and expertise. There is more than enough to do in post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

There remains a tension between the practice of deploying NATO on post-conflict tasks, and the rhetoric of successive Alliance summits, which look for the most modern warfighting capabilities. Some suspect that the US sees NATO as a useful forum to encourage individual members to update capabilities. This then allows coalitions of the willing to be built through bi-lateral arrangements. The NATO role becomes little more than setting equipment standards and sharing military doctrine. The lessons from the Iraq conflict of 2003 will undoubtedly reinforce the importance of precision weaponry and network centric warfare. Yet investment in these capabilities may be at the expense of the troops that are proving so vital after the fighting is over.

#### *Future Paths*

As tempers cool, political leaders will need to work at rebuilding these key international institutions. The UN has many tasks, and has survived previous spats. It will have to become re-engaged in Iraq. The EU also has more to bind it together than just foreign and security policy. It has much work to do on its own programme of enlargement. Yet, it cannot put off for ever the development of a coherent approach to international action. Only as a regional actor can it expect to be taken seriously by the United States. What the EU still has to decide is whether it wants to work at the hard power end of the spectrum. At the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Greece on 2 May 2003, there was encouraging support for the idea that Javier Solana should begin the development of a security doctrine.

Without new thinking on strategy, collective EU defence efforts will at best remain focused on the Petersberg Tasks. Some nations will continue to want to be able to project military power independently or as contributors to transitory coalitions. NATO may then have greater difficulty with its own role. If it is not needed for intervention operations like Afghanistan or Iraq, then initiatives to generate modern warfighting capabilities will seem less urgent. After its success in the Balkans, its future may come to be seen as more concerned with post-conflict security work than in tasks appropriate to a NATO Response Force.

Many fear such a division of labour across the Atlantic, which would broadly find Europe cleaning up after US interventions. Without some serious strategic thinking by the EU and NATO, this may be the outcome. The US with a few allies would produce the hard warfighting capability when needed (and preferably when asked for by the UN); NATO would provide a ready peace enforcement force for immediate post-conflict problems; and the EU would be left to police and rebuild civil society. A more balanced sharing of global security responsibilities must be a better route. If the EU develops its new strategic concept to include the use of hard power, then it can work with NATO to ensure that the US is not left to police the world on its own.

**June 16th 2003, London**



## **NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ**

### **BRIEFING PAPER NO. 13 – COMMENTS ON JIM GARRISON’S BRIEFING PAPER NO.2 “MODELS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO US POWER”**

**- Alfredo Toro Hardy** – Venezuelan Diplomat and author of the book “The Age of Villages: the Small Village vs. the Global Village”

Having been invited to participate in this Seminar in a personal level, I would like to express my comments about the above-mentioned subject in such capacity. Within the context of the enlightening exposition made by Mr James Garrison, I would like to add some additional remarks that may broaden the scope of the subject matter.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the notion of sovereignty took shape. While in the domestic field the State exercised undisputed supremacy, in the international field it was impossible to superimpose any type of authority over the states. In practice the latter meant an atmosphere bound to create confrontation and anarchy. Over the subsequent centuries several thesis and projects emerged, aimed at projecting a reasonable degree of governance in the international arena. From Kant’s thesis on Confederation and Perpetual Peace to the League of Nations of Woodrow Wilson, multiple attempts were made in that sense. It was not until the final and subsequent stages of World War Two, under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, that an interweave of multilateral organisations and alliances, susceptible to sustain something similar to a global governance system, took form.

Under the effort of President Roosevelt the United Nations Organisation came into being and the Bretton Woods Agreements lead to the creation of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the International Trade Organisation (ITO). Under President Truman a whole system of alliances, organisations and plans, linking the United States with Western Europe, Japan and Latin America emerged. These links were consolidated during Kennedy’s Administration, with the strengthening of the Atlantic Community and the conversion of the European Economic Cooperation into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further afield of the United Nations Organisation that transcended the American primacy, a sophisticated international structure existed under the realm of Washington’s hegemony.

The seventies brought about a profound crisis to the above-mentioned framework. The conflict and failure of Vietnam strongly shook the prestige and credibility of the United States, while the flotation of the dollar, under President Nixon, cast doubts on the whole Bretton Woods system. The absence of alternatives to American leadership during the Cold War helped to overcome the former, while the world debt crisis allowed for the relaunch of the Bretton Woods organisations under new parameters.

After the collapse of communism the whole world had to accommodate itself to an international order where the United States was not only the main artificer but also its principal beneficiary. Simultaneously, the neo-liberal credo under which the Washington Consensus was based, transformed itself into an inescapable worldwide reference. During the Clinton Administration the system was further refined. With the understanding that the reserves of “soft power” constituted the great strength of his country, Clinton policies immensely contributed to shape the language of globalisation according to American beliefs, life style and popular culture. A network of multilateral institutions, markets, security alliances and shared beliefs, generated a global governance system without parallel in history. Through it the United States could exercise its undisputed hegemony in a veiled way.

The present American Administration has preferred to relate to the rest of the world under new terms, abandoning shared global values and consensual multilateralism in favour of a narrow national interest and a militant unilateralism. What are the implications of this new reality?

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri made a distinction between imperialism and empire. Imperialism would be none other than the expansion of the sovereignty of the ruling power over the spheres it controls. Empire, on the other hand, is a form of power expressed through an international consensus

on a set of rules and beliefs. The essence of empire is a form of power that has permeated the collective conscience, determining its fundamental values (*Empire*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000). Michel Foucault remarked on the existence of two types of society: the “disciplinary society” and the “control society”. The former involves a social command in which patterns of behaviour are sanctioned through a powerful apparatus. The latter, on the contrary, involves a society in which norms of behaviour have been internalised as part of their own core of beliefs (*Dits et ecrits*, Paris, Gallimard, 1994). Joseph Nye made the distinction between “hard power” and “soft power.” The first one being established through conventional power formulas such as coercion and military might. The second one, articulated through the “universality of a country’s culture” and its ability to create a set of “favourable rules and institutions” that allows its international dissemination (*Bound to Lead: The Changing Character of American Power*, New York, Basic Books, 1991). The common denominator among the former definitions constitutes the essence of real power: that which may be internalised as the product of a general consensus.

The extraordinary merit of the United States had been to achieve such a form of power. One in which its hegemony was able to transcend the boundaries of coercive power, creating an international consensus around its values and projecting them as universal beliefs. The real nature of such power lay in the possibility of implementing what Ignacio Ramonet called “the single thought.” A good description of that single thought could be found in the following words by Benjamin Barber: “In the old times capitalism had to capture the political institutions and the elites in order to control politics, philosophy and religion and, in this way, impose an ideology at its service. Today it markets ideology itself as one of its most profitable products”. (*Jihad vs. McWorld*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1996). That was, indeed, the true nature of American power and the essence of the global governance system that it had been able to create.

The above has been immersed in a dynamic flux. And not for the better. Since its arrival in office the Bush Administration has been dismantling, step by step, a multilateral system and a set of consensual rules and beliefs, which were an historical American heritage and which had brought to that country gigantic levels of leverage and moral authority. Having reached the boundaries of post-modern power, the United States has gone back to old-fashioned understandings on the nature of power. Under this process we are witnessing a backward movement from empire to imperialism, from the society of control to the disciplinary society and from soft power to hard power.

America’s relation with the rest of the world is being shaped through ad hoc coalitions, privileged partnerships, clear cut definitions between the “with us” and the “against us” and reward and punishment mechanisms. This is not, indeed, the best prescription for a global governance system.

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