

## “NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & UNIVERSAL CHALLENGES: CHOICES FOR THE WORLD AFTER IRAQ”

Commission on Globalisation Conference – “Sovereignty and Universal Challenges:  
Together or Apart?”

Closing Dialogue between R. James Woolsey and Tom Spencer

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### **R. JAMES WOOLSEY**

Thank you. I was quite honoured to be invited to speak to this very distinguished group. But since I spent 25 years as a Washington lawyer, and I spent some time at the CIA in the Clinton Administration, I am very honoured to be invited into any polite company for any purposes whatsoever.

There was a lovely world once, we thought. A world in which our economies and networks operated in such a way that we could take advantage of world-wide technological opportunities through trade. A world of prosperity. A world in which it would make some kind of rough sense, both corporate and governmental, to be organised around specific subjects that would more or less stay within their boundaries: foreign affairs, trade, the environment. It was an interesting and structured world, but I think it has been an imaginary world for a long time.

Different people have awakened in different ways and at different times and under different influences to the fact that in fact various parts of the world and various parts of what governments have to deal with won't stay in their compartments. And further to the fact that the interdependence which in many ways has economic and cultural and other advantages is not necessarily something that brings stability or security.

Social sciences and politics are often influenced by thinking in the sciences. I believe that much of the social science world, much of politics and many of the principles of governmental and bureaucratic organisations have stayed mired in straightforward action and reaction thinking, along the lines of Newtonian physics, far longer than physicists or anyone working in the real sciences would have stayed mired there. In recent years people have increasingly come, in terms of relationships between political and economic forces, to talk in terms of a complexity theory derived from the French mathematician Poincaré's discovery that in dynamic interactions between three or more variables, the distinction between what was in fact controlling and what was not being controlled seemed to go away, and everything depended upon everything. Unpredictability seemed to be the rule; certainly Lorenz found that as he programmed his computer to do some predictions of weather, used a larger set of decimal places to the right of the decimal point, and found that his model produced wildly varying results – leading to a lot of books about the butterfly effect. One butterfly flutters its wings and you end up having typhoons at the other end of the world. The chaos theory in short has been folded into this new and far more thoughtful appreciation of uncertainty, unpredictability and concern: we are not going to know what the predictable outcomes are of specific social or political actions.

In this world, this real world of unpredictability and complexity as a result of interdependence, what about the old arguments about unilateralism versus multilateralism, or about sovereignty? Sovereignty of what kind? The EU's sovereignty? The individual nation-state's sovereignty? A lot of those issues, in my view, have become outdated – as outdated as government bureaucracies that think that if they are working on an environmental question or a retirement policy question then they are not really going to have effects in other areas.

This interdependence and complexity of social and economic effects produces a circumstance in which two types of major crises can take place. One I would call malignant. And Europe in general has been better attuned to malignant problems than the US.

Let me give you one example of malignancy derived from interdependence. In the international trade network 'just in time delivery' is an excellent concept. It draws on interdependence and the availability around the world of different types of components for manufacturing. It lets people lower the costs for their corporations since they don't have to keep big inventories. It gives a lot of flexibility. Everything works fine with four or five days of manufacturing components available for your factory, as long as the containers with the new components keep arriving on time. But there are a number of things that can disrupt that lovely world. Just in time works fine as long as there is not a major strike as there was on the West Coast of the US amongst the trade unions dealing with shipping, a few months ago. That kind of strike can have a very malignant effect on manufacturing operations, not only in the US, but in other countries around the world as ships coming from Asia stop, but can't unload. Economic difficulties cascade.

Global warming is a perfect example of a malignant problem. It is a problem that isn't created or planned by anyone. Certain interactive effects of modern life, our decision for instance to drive SUVs, can increase substantially global warming emissions and therefore contribute to climatic change and serious problems, including potentially the flooding of Bangladesh. Consumers who drive SUVs don't think they contribute to the flooding of Bangladesh, but in a sense they may well be contributing. I would say again that in Europe there has been with respect of these types of impacts, resulting from the interdependent networks around the world, a better appreciation in general, more sophistication than is sometimes the case in the US with respect to such issues as global warming.

But there is another problem. Not all disruptions in the interdependent world that we live in are merely malignant. Some of them are caused by malevolence. Take again the case of the containers arriving every day for the factory, and into that world, in which 50,000 shipping containers a day cross the borders of the US and only 2% are inspected, inject a dirty bomb. Let's say it's coming from a part of the world that commonly exports textiles, but in fact in the middle of the textiles in the container is a fair amount of explosive with strontium 90 and caesium 137 packed around it. This is not anything that would produce a nuclear detonation but it is certainly something that would spread a great deal of radioactive material. Assume it is detonated in a city in the US or in Europe with a simple GPS detonator, say in New York or Chicago. At that point we would start inspecting 100% of the containers coming into the US. And of course in 4 or 5 days the components are used up very quickly and people have nothing to do at their manufacturing facilities.

These networks amongst which we live are extraordinarily vulnerable to intentional malevolent interference – terrorism – just as they can have malignant effects that we don't intend – global warming. I would suggest to you that whereas in Europe the appreciation of malignancy on some issues has been in advance of that in the US, the appreciation of effects of malevolent interference are on the whole not quite so advanced on the European continent as they are in the US.

This of course is the result of September 11. The US in particular changed fundamentally that day. It came to be understood in the course of a morning that networks can have their weak points exploited and can be turned into devices to kill thousands of people. For example, our transport network that day was one in which – although there were a number of warnings over the years about the flimsy nature of cockpit doors – terrorists had the opportunity not only to crash the aircraft and kill everyone on board, but, because the cockpit doors were flimsy, to take them over fly them into buildings and kill thousands of people. As a result of looking at that we have come to ascertain that many of the networks that serve us so well in peacetime have in them flaws analogous to the flimsy cockpit doors of the airliners on September 11. In the electricity grid, these tend to be the transformers and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks that operate through the internet. These make the grid vulnerable to interference. In the transportation industry, the part dealing with toxic chemicals, these weaknesses tend to be various aspects of the railroad system. But we are not alone. All modern technological societies that live with these networks – food production and delivery, the internet, oil and gas pipelines, the electricity grid and so on – live in a world in which malevolence can be used devastatingly as a weapon against societies.

In my judgement we are engaged in a very long war. I believe that in the war we are in now deals with terrorist groups in the Middle East, with states such as Iraq was, and which Syria, Libya, Sudan and Iran in many ways still are, and with the interactive effects of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and states showing that degree of oppression. This has produced a conflict in which we in the West are likely to be engaged for decades.

I believe the most lasting aspect of the forces on the other side is the Islamist movement within the Sunni side of Islam, al Qaeda being its cutting edge. This is heavily because it is so well financed from the oil wealth of the Gulf. It functions in many ways as a virtual state, with resources around the world and the ability to take the long view and operate with great care, even if its activities are disrupted for a time by arrests such as we have been able to bring about in actions such as we have taken in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I think that this war will be one in which only portions will be military. The best analogue I can think of is the Cold War. Certainly there were two reasonably large size military engagements fought during the Cold War, at least from the American military perspective, namely Korea and Vietnam. But much of the outcome of the Cold War depended on what we did with other-than-military means behind the protection of allied military forces and the nuclear deterrent that kept the Soviet Union, and China in some cases, generally contained. The Cold War won one in no small measures, because we recognised early on that it was not a clash of civilisations, not a clash of cultures, nor a clash of countries. It was a clash of freedom against tyranny. We convinced over a substantial period of time the Lech Walensas, the Vaclav Havels, the Andrei Sacharovs, the Solidarities, people on the other side of the Iron Curtain, that we were on their side and they should be on ours. In no small measure, that is why we won.

All along the way compromises were made for tactical reasons, in WWI and WWII as well as the Cold War. In this set of, essentially, three world wars in the 20th century, the most significant compromise we made in the name of statecraft was that we were willing to be the ally, for three years and eight months, of history's greatest murderer, Stalin, because we had a more immediate problem, Hitler. Along the way we made compromises by making common cause with Chiang Kai-shek, various South Korean dictators, Salazar, Franco, Pinochet. Some compromises were wise; some were unwise.

What is interesting though, is what has happened as a result of the events of the last 89 years, since the guns of August 1914. As a result of those three world wars, two hot, one cold, the world has gone from about a dozen democracies in August of 1914 - the US, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, the Netherlands and a few other countries in Europe - to, at the last Freedom House calculation, 121, or 62% of the world's governments. Eighty-nine of these have both regular elections and the main elements of the rule of law. Thirty-two have regular elections, but major deficiencies with difference aspect of the rule of law, such as corruption - countries such as Russia and Indonesia. But nothing like this remotely ever happened in world history before: a movement in a single lifetime from a handful of democracies to the substantial majority of the world's governments - literally an order of magnitude increase in freedom.

Europe has been the most stunning transformation. From a few democracies on the continent, early in the century that saw nazi, fascist and communist dictatorships, to today: everywhere except for Belarus and the Ukraine, Europe is free. It is concerned, as it should be, with integrating, with the expansion of the EU, with all the things that having a number of democratic governments on the continent make possible.

Democracy other than that has had some other positive effects. It is in fact a central, if not the central tool for bringing peace and disarmament. Democracies don't really fight one another. It is almost impossible to find historical examples. Dictatorships fight democracies and they fight one another. Democracies argue about things like farm subsidies, which is what democracies should spend their time on, sorting out problems of that sort. As far as disarmament goes, the major nuclear programmes abandoned in the 1980s, were the South African, Brazilian and Argentinian. None of that had anything to do with arms control agreements or the United Nations. It had to do with democracy. It is because those three countries changed in fundamental ways and moved from being dictatorships to becoming democracies that they gave up their nuclear programmes. So democracy and the rule of law help with a number of problems. It is not a panacea, it is not irreversible; look at Venezuela today. But generally it tends to move things forward in very positive ways.

If you look at the Middle East today, it is an area in which there are two democracies: Israel and Turkey. The other governments are either pathological predators or vulnerable autocracies. This is not a good mix. In the 22 states of the Arab world there are no democracies. There are some states that exhibit some guarantee of civil liberties, in the Gulf, in Morocco, and are making serious improvements in the role of women and the like, but no democracies. A courageous report by the Arab

intellectuals to the UN a few months ago stressed some of the serious problems in the Arab world. Almost half of the women are being kept illiterate; exports other than oil and gas total from the Arab world only what Finland exports. One fifth as many books are being translated every year into Arabic as are translated into Greek. There are a number of problems that need to be faced in the Middle East and the Arab world in particular.

But as far as Islam goes, one should not assume that there is any fundamental inconsistency between Islam and democracy. The vast majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims live in democracies: Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Turkey, The Balkans, Mali, Senegal. In the Arab world there are a number of green shoots that come up through the sand: brave newspaper editors and others who are willing to step forward in the name of civil liberties and human rights. We need to cultivate those green shoots, like we cultivated Walensa, Havel, Solidarity, and Sacharov. As we do that we must also in the years to come both fight terrorism and deal with malevolent states. These struggles will be conducted both militarily and non-militarily.

As we do our best to bring long-term stability and peace to the Middle East through an expansion of the rule of law and democracy, we will be told by a number of people that this is naive, a typical American sort of naiveté, probably neo-con inspired and basically a worthless notion. Well I certainly would admit to the difficulties. But I have to say, if one looks at Europe of not too many years ago, the bulk of it didn't seem too democratically inclined.

Substantial effort and work will be involved, and much of it will be non-military. After all, we changed a lot of governments – and when I say “we” I always mean the democracies generally – during the Cold War by means other than military force. In Poland the Pope and the AFL-CIO were centrally important. In Spain and Portugal a brave Spanish king and the German Social Democrats steered the socialists away from communism. This expansion of freedom happened in a lot of different ways.

As we undertake these same efforts in the decades to come, and it is the only way to achieve what we have to achieve, a lot of people will say Arabs will never be able to operate democracies. Their progenitors said Germans would never be able to operate a democracy, and the Japanese would never be able to (and that McArthur was crazy to give them that constitution). Other progenitors said that Catholics would never be able to operate democracies: look at Spain and Portugal and Latin America in the 1970s. But you know, the Germans, the Japanese and the Catholics began to figure it out. Look at the Russians, the same people said: they missed the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment. How could they have a democracy? But the Russians started to figure it out, too. Chinese culture is completely alien to the notion of democracy, said self-serving Asian dictators, but the Taiwanese seem to have figured it out. And Mongolia has become a perfectly fine democracy. All of the cynics for the last 80 to 90 years who have with self-importance and pompousness lectured us how X would never be able to become a democracy, have basically been wrong. I would submit to you that today there is one, and only one, word to describe accurately the view that Arabs will never be able to operate democracies under the rule of law. That word is ‘racist’.

As we move in this direction of democratisation - and I think it is the only reasonable goal in an interdependent world that suffers both from malignancies and malevolence in order to move it toward peace and security – we will hear from a number of people, particularly in the Middle East, “you are making us very nervous”. Particularly the authoritarians, who operate and benefit from the status quo will say it again and again. And our response should be: yes, good. We want you with us, but if you are not, then we want you nervous. We want you to realise that now, for the fourth time in a hundred years, the world's democracies are awake and on the march and we are on the side of those whom you most fear: your own people.

#### **TOM SPENCER**

Thank you Mr Woolsey. Actually my mother in law always says that nowadays you have to know someone very well to know their surnames, so perhaps I might straight move to Jim. Can I move to the bits of your excellent contribution with which I absolutely agree? I do agree with the difference between ‘malignancy’ and ‘malevolence’ I think you are right. There are historic reasons for that. Secondly I am grateful for the care of your presentation on one point. You said those who died in the Twin Towers, not all of whom were Americans. So often it is as if the only victims of that attack had been only citizens of the United States, rather than citizens from across the world. That may look like a

nuance to some people, to those who lost – I think 600 in the case of the British and larger numbers in the case of the Indians – it matters. This was not just an attack on the US, it was an attack on civilisation, or at least a particular form of civilisation. Thirdly, I absolutely agree with you about the importance of recognising that we live in a world of complexity. The institutions that we talk about so easily and so glibly don't have a kind of Newtonian certainty about them. You pull one lever: something happens. I recently made the bold and probably unwise decision to write an article in the Journal of Public Affairs using physics as a model for public affairs. Hans Peter Durr was kind enough to say I got it roughly right, and then sent me 40 pages with explanations of how I might improve the model! But it does seem to me that we need to recognise that we can take images from the world of quantum mechanics or string theory to understand the political world. As an environmentalist, I also want to take images from the Gaia approach, a holistic approach, believing that everything is connected to everything else. Life is not as simple as the textbooks say and not so simple as the politician's final purple paragraphs imply.

One of the most common purple paragraphs says – and I want to offer it generally to all those in the room as something that we might get back to at some future conference – “the Soviet Union collapsed”. This is the phrase often used by Europeans, or was “defeated” by America or by the West. The implications are rather important. If it was defeated then systemic change, the ability to engineer political change across the world, is practical. If it collapsed because of its internal contradictions, then maybe some Americans have learned the wrong lesson.

Let me move to the substance of what you are arguing, which is the importance of democracy, the primacy of democracy. I am, as many people know by now, a complete beltway addict and find it almost impossible to let any three months pass without being inside the beltway collecting journals and talking to American friends. I came across the book “The Future of Freedom” by Fareed Zakaria, the Editor of Newsweek, about two months ago, before its publication in Europe. It argues that democracy is not enough. That too much democracy or democracy without the institutions of good governance can lead to the diminishment of liberty. This is an argument for those of us who believe both in democracy and in liberty to confront, internalise and to think about. That is particularly the case if, like me, you are interested in process; interested, that is, in how the political process actually works, rather than how elected politicians say it works. As a Burkean Conservative I make no particular apology for saying that there may well be a difference between how the elites say the system works in public and how they know it to work in private. One of the points which Zakaria makes is that, unintentionally, successive moves to reform the way the political system operates in Washington by opening it up, have actually had the perverse effect of opening it up more effectively to lobbyists and the power of money than was anticipated. This has given an instability to the nature of American politics on the federal level, which makes it difficult to govern America, let alone to project American power, imperially or otherwise around the world. He makes a similar point about the deregulation of the media. He cites technological changes leading to the encouragement of feeding frenzies and the effective ending of self regulation amongst the quality press and quality television as to what one might report. He makes what I would consider his absolute crucial point when he says that the evolution of the system internally in the States – and we have seen something of it here in Europe – has destroyed the integrity of the political parties in the American system. We are left with what he calls “Potemkin Parties”. Parties that meet for congresses but don't actually take decisions in those congresses. The key decisions are taken as the results of lobbies and influence and money. Lobbies, influence and money have always been there in any political system. You can find them in the ancient Iranian courts and probably earlier. But he argues – and I have to say that he is right – they have actually done severe damage to the way the American political system reflects or does not reflect the will of the American people.

I am, for half of my time, the Director of the European Centre for Public Affairs. I am interested in what is actually happening, whether it is in Europe, in America or the global political space that governs so much of the decisions in our life. Many years ago I had the privilege to work for three months for Senator Tower of Texas. It was a wonderful experience. He was anglophile, and he bought his suits in Saville Row. After about two months he did me the privilege, because I was about 21, of taking me to a rather good Washington restaurant and talking through to how the Hill actually worked. He quoted that old story about legislation being like sausages, the end product is alright, but you shouldn't look too closely at the process. It is the process, and the degradation of the process, which is the most important if we want to understand how America has responded to the shock of September 11, and how its attitudes have changed towards the rest of the world in that period.

I said earlier in the Conference, but perhaps I might be allowed to repeat it now, that it is for those of us who love America that life has been difficult since September 11 2001. For those who instinctively hate America, life has actually been simple. It is what has happened to the American responses to each other as Americans, to rest of us and the rest of the world that has been so difficult and at times painful.

If I look at process for a moment, I want to look at how that impacts on three of the universal challenges we are considering. I have had the privilege of being someone who has worked on public affairs both inside and outside government. The privilege of sitting in rooms with governments, parties, companies, NGOs and churches, planning campaigns that occasionally use some of the black arts of public affairs. I have been lobbied by distinguished American lobbyists, who tried to make me join the campaign to defend the use of fossil fuels and inadvertently, because they didn't understand what the word 'Conservative' meant in Europe, they explained how they had already acquired a complete chokehold on all the key points in the US Congress, such that in legislation doing anything about global warming would never happen. They offered me a large sum of money to advise them on how to do that in Europe. And when I said you've got the wrong man, they persisted and explained exactly what their strategy was. It was about denying the science and pretending that any measure was a tax. They gave me the whole strategy. A week later I became the European Parliament Rapporteur on Climate Change. It was very helpful to have the strategy of the other side before I started. So I have seen some of the black arts., which, if they are intelligent, involve the manipulation of ideas. That requires respect for ideas and that raises the question of where do the ideas come from. "How do we get this think tank to say that?" or "this Committee of Parliament to say this?" That is what politics and public affairs are about. I think we delude ourselves when we can describe process which does not incorporate those mechanisms in our model of reality in the world. Everyone in this room who has been involved in practical politics has a particular look on their faces at this moment, because they know what I am talking about. Only a very few of you look benignly innocent or puzzled.

I want to celebrate in my remaining moments some of the magnificence of America. One of the great joys of Washington is that you can sit and read the political journals and they will tell you with great pride, whether it is the Project for the New American Century or the Heritage Foundation, exactly what they want to achieve and normally how they want to achieve it. Thank you. I wish Europe was as open about its political debates. It is not a question of pointing to conspiracy theories, it is a question of saying: "here is the strategy". It is laid out. At least Europe, if it wants to understand the political system in Washington, should do it with the courtesy of going to Washington and reading the open texts. I saw in reading these open texts a perfectly logically worked out timetable for the disruption of multilateralist rivals to US power. I think it was a brilliant use of the horror of September 2001. To take that horror and to give wings to what were pre-existing ideas about the nature, reinvention and extension of US hegemony. I cannot criticise that. The British fought for a century to maintain hegemony. I do not object to that. I just want the rest of the world understand what is happening. And that America understands and is clear about our understanding.

I am a Conservative. I am interested in power and process and how things actually happen. So I observe with some interest the "shock and awe" diplomacy being deployed by America, not just in Europe, but around the world in order to maintain her hegemony. I cannot complain about that. I observe the intelligence with which it is being carried out, the fact that it respects the importance of ideas. I think the selling of Robert Kagan's ideas is one of the great marketing successes of the last ten years and we should salute it. But there is a difference between admiring the process and the mechanism and approving of its aims. Just as there is a difference between isolationism and a withdrawal from international commitments, and a unilateralism that says "We don't want to do this but you are not going to do this either". It seems to me perfectly acceptable for the Americans to say "We do not want to be part of the International Criminal Court". It does not seem to be acceptable to say "We want to destroy the International Criminal Court". It seems to be perfectly acceptable for the Americans – or some Americans – to say "We withdraw our support for European integration", but it is a different thing to send diplomats and lobbyists to actively seek to disrupt and divide Europe.

Jim made reference to American naiveté. I think this is one of the greatest and most intelligently exploited exercises in American diplomacy. I know very few naive Americans. I know many extremely intelligent, extremely hard nosed, extremely worldly wise Americans. I know a lot of vain Europeans who think that they are the sophisticated ones and the Americans are the bumbling naive ones. If that vanity continues the Europeans will pay a huge price for it. There was a beautiful article two days ago in the Wall Street Journal defending Mr Rumsfeld against the charge that he is a bumbling yokel. He

makes these off target one liners and it is all very embarrassing. No, no says the Journal, he is being intelligent. I agree with the Wall Street Journal because every one of those one-liners is absolutely on target; everyone of them is beautifully rehearsed and every one of them builds a reputation. A reputation with which Rumsfeld is loved at home and feared abroad. The Romans had a tag for that – *oderint dum metuant*. If the Europeans believe this is accidental and naive, they are merely being vain and they deserve to be out-manoeuvred.

In conclusion, let me pick up just three of the challenges with which we have sought to engage, and ask ourselves whether it matters if America is involved in a unilateralist response to these challenges. “A coalition of the willing” was until about 18 months ago a European idea to express going ahead with the Kyoto Protocol without the Americans. Now it is a US description of putting together ad-hoc coalitions. Let’s look at these universal challenges and global governance, at the terrorism. September 11 must have been one of the great intelligence failures of all times. If you want the inside story go and read a brilliant book published in the US, but as far as I know not yet in Europe, called “The Age of Sacred Terror” by Benjamin & Simon, the Director and Deputy Director of Counter Terrorism in the National Security Council under President Clinton. They resigned in August 2000 because they could not make the conflicting baronies of American power take seriously the threat from Al Queda. And why? Well the second part of their book is an analysis of why. They say it is because in the power struggle after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a fight between the Air Force and the other baronies to defend budgets and to justify the establishment of the National Missile Defence programme. That programme required ‘rogue states’ who could fire rockets; not ‘failed states’, who could deliver dirty bombs. This is not Tom Spencer saying this. These are the White House people who were making the case for counter-terrorist activity. I have to say that in public affairs terms it rings absolutely true. I have seen it in corporations and I have seen it in NGOs. People want a target they can deal with. They want the decision they think they can influence, rather than the target they actually face or the decision they really need to influence.

Secondly, let’s take the environment issue. Again I am going to call on what I call the magnificence of American thought. I listened recently at Brunel University to John McNeil from Georgetown, author of “Something New Under the Sun”, an environmental historian, I have been an environmentalist for 12 years and I never had my views on the environment so rapidly changes by one lecture as John achieved a couple of weeks ago. He pointed out that something new under the sun really did happen in the 20th century in terms of the impact we make on the environment. He attributes most of it to the ‘security anxiety’ of the great powers. He points out that it was waste from the early development of nuclear weapons that has had a massively greater impact on our environment than the civil nuclear power programme. He pointed out that it was the military wanting big populations – pro-natalism as he calls it - which actually encouraged population growth. He talks about the restructuring of whole regions for reasons of military preparedness, whether in China, Russia or in America. He traces to that security anxiety many of the environmental problems which we now face as a species. It is that extension of permanent ‘security anxiety’ which those who believe we are now fighting a fifty-year war are actually seeking to extend. Now I absolutely open myself to your counterattack Jim, because I don’t know the answer. Yes there is a threat from dirty bombs. Yes there are horrendous threats to our cities. But we have lived with the worse threat of total nuclear oblivion for 40 years. I just say ‘be careful’, if you think that the establishment of the state of permanent security anxiety makes governance easier. It may well do, but it has all sorts of hidden costs and greater threats to our survival as a species.

Finally one last example. Professor Kurth wrote in the National Interest last month on Migration and Empire, on the imperial patterns of both Europe and America over the last hundred years. He describes an outward push of power, and then by the 1950s and 1960s immigrant pressure coming back to the metropolitan capitals. French North Africans coming to France, Indians, Pakistanis and Africans coming to Britain and the same for the Spanish and the Portuguese. The same mechanism is working for America with the Hispanics. He points out that both Europe and America are changing in demographic terms. Each becoming two nations. One secular, rich, old and feeble. The other Islamic or Latino, poor, young and robust. It is happening on both sides of the Atlantic.

How much of our debates today, yesterday, or any of the other debates we take part in actually reflect what is happening in that real world of universal challenges. I know the answer to that question: precious few. We prefer to argue about that which we think we can control, rather than that which is really threatening. I think we owe ourselves, Europe and America, China, Japan and the rest, at least the honesty of accepting that we are faced by universal challenges. We need to find mechanisms that

work in response. So Jim, thank you for flying the Atlantic and facing the savagery of this room, despite jet lag. I think this is an important debate, but I think we should not be distracted too much by the excitement of Anglo-Saxon debate amongst ourselves. I think we should keep our eyes steadily fixed on the threats which are long-term and which we as a species ignore at our great peril. Thank you.

#### **R. JAMES WOOLSEY**

I thank Tom for his comments, but I may never forgive him for spreading this terrible notion that Americans are not naive. My father for example was a very fine poker player, a lawyer in Tulsa Oklahoma. His favourite prey were New York lawyers who would come to town for an anti trust case or something. In those days, the 1950s, men would sit around after dinner and somebody would suggest playing poker and my father's line was always: "Well, ah don't really know how to play, but ah'd shore like to learn." It worked very well. So, damn you Tom for undermining this historic pattern of American behaviour. I may never forgive you.

Fareed Zakaria has written a fine book in which he takes blemishes and turns them into a trend. There is one underlying point that is very important however: when we say democracy is our objective we should always mean democracy under the rule of law. The mistakes we have made in the Balkans by moving too quickly to elections and ending up with thugs, is something we need to take account of in Iraq and elsewhere.

I think Jerry Bremer is moving in a positive direction in Iraq. This is going to take several years. It will not be something that can be done immediately. In Iraq we are not building on sand literally or figuratively. This is the part of the world that invented the rule of law in Hammurabi's time. It also had fine civil and criminal codes in the 20s and 50s. There is a lot to build on.

And we have to realise that when we talk about democracy we do not mean "one election once" which Bin Laden wins and then he and, in his view, God rule. No, that is not what we are talking about.

I think it is also important to realise – and here I take cognisance of what several people have told me about discussions in earlier parts of the conference before I arrived – that what we do not mean, in the Pentagon or any other part of the US government, by moving countries towards democracy, is moving them into a situation that they agree with the United States. That's empire. But if we really were acting imperially we would not have dealt with Turkey in the way we did when we badly wanted the 4th Division to go through and the elected Turkish parliament said no. We headed the ships out to sea and moved south through the Suez Canal. That's not what an empire does.

Yet it has been alleged by some that the United States is essentially an empire today. If so, it is a remarkably odd one. If you somehow pulled together a group of real emperors from the past - say Trajan, Nebuchadnezzah, Napoleon, Hitler, the Kaiser, Philip the Second – and they saw Turkey, Germany, Saudi Arabia and South Korea in one way or another indicate that they didn't want US armed forces around any more, they would doubtless be quite astounded by our response: "OK, goodbye". This collection of real imperialists would undoubtedly say: "Hey, wait a minute you are going the wrong way. What empires do when people disagree with them is to add troops. They don't take them out".

If one would consider in this vein two recent American "emperors", Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton, one would also have to say their behaviour is unlike that of any emperor in world history. In the first case – if you consulted these past imperial personages I described – they would tell you that "emperor" Nixon was a particularly poor emperor, having been driven from office by hearings, by the people's elected representatives, following a bungled burglary against his political opponents and lying about the subsequent events. That is an awfully odd imperial thing to do. To just resign in shame and get on that helicopter and fly away. What about "emperor" Clinton? His disposition being taken in a case by a private individual – a woman who claimed he sexually harassed her. The "emperor", under American law, had to give testimony on that embarrassing subject in a private lawsuit. And because he was accused of lying in that deposition he was impeached by the people's elected representatives, tried before the Senate and acquitted. Some emperor.

I do have to admit that “emperor” Bush is different. Because “emperor” Bush, along with his friend Tony Blair, only persuaded two countries in Europe to support them in their view of how to deal with Iraq. Germany and France of course persuaded 18 to go along with them. So “emperor” Bush publicly made a speech in which he said that the leaders of these 18 countries were “badly brought up”, that they “missed an opportunity to shut up” and that he was going to do his best to cut them off without the advantages of free trade. Wait a minute... Did I get the facts wrong on that one aspect? Maybe it wasn't “emperor” Bush. Maybe it was another emperor. (An emperor manqué?)

If one looks at the actual behaviour of the US over the course of the last several years, O would suggest it doesn't look all that imperial. Certainly there is a lot of American “soft power” evident in the world. Jacques Bové tells us about that when he beats up on McDonald signs. But nobody is telling Jaques or anyone else to eat big Macs. And as far as imperial power is concerned, anyone who has taken the trouble to read the Bush Administration's national strategy statement of last September will see that there are three criteria for the exercise of pre-emptive or preventive war if the US and its allies should so choose, and all three are required. One is an extremely oppressive dictatorship. The second is programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The third is involvement with international terrorism. Those criteria do not assert any right for the US to go wandering around the world bashing whomever it may choose. Burma, for instance, doesn't qualify for preventative use of force under these criteria, however terrible a dictatorship it is. It is not involved with international terrorism and is not really involved with weapons of mass destruction. So this has not been a claim for some type of license to rampage about the world and make war. And those who have so alleged have not read it – either that or they have read it and don't care what it says.

I would like to close with one final thought. People may have a hard time understanding some aspects of the US today because in a way we haven't been like this since the 1940s. September 11 had an impact on the States in many ways similar to Pearl Harbour. And it is impossible to really understand American behaviour and American policies today without understanding that.

The world in which Pearl Harbour came, was a world after having participated with our allies in winning World War 1, we were having a national beach party, called the roaring twenties. Many aspects of that beach party survived into the thirties, not our prosperity but certainly the neglect of our military. The Japanese took a look at us at the beginning of the 1940s and saw essentially a rich reckless spoiled country that had its army drilling with wooden rifles in Louisiana, that wouldn't fortify Wake Island and wouldn't fortify Guam and really wouldn't fight. They had some evidence for that. Now they were surprised after December 7th of 1941, but their behaviour was not entirely irrational given American behaviour in the 20s and 30s.

If you look at the somewhat parallel situation at the beginning of the 21st century and put yourself in the position of the leadership of Al Qaeda, you might say to yourself something like this:

“Let's see. What are these Americans likely to do if we move against them? We really want to get them out of the Middle East, get them out of supporting these regimes like the Mubarak's. In 1979 their hostages were seized in Teheran and they tied yellow ribbons around trees. In 1982-83 their embassy and marine barracks were blown up in Beirut, and they left. Throughout the rest of the 80s various terrorist acts were committed against them and occasionally they would lob in a bomb or a missile from afar and they prosecuted a few people and that was about it. In 1991 they had Saddam on the ropes, 500,000 troops in country, they had encouraged the Kurds and Shia to rebel against him and then they stopped and stood back and watched the Kurds and Shia being massacred by the Republican Guard. In 1993 Saddam tried to kill former President Bush with a bomb in Kuwait and what do they do? President Clinton fired a few cruise missiles into an empty building in the middle of the night in Baghdad thereby retaliating quite successfully against Iraqi cleaning women and night watchmen but not particularly effectively against Saddam. In 1993 their helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu and their Rangers were killed, and they left. And throughout the rest of the 90s we and others launched various terrorist attacks against them, and they did the same thing they did in the 80s – they sent their lawyers, they prosecuted some people and they lobbed in a few cruise missiles and bombs from afar. They are scared, and they won't fight”.

In short, al Qaeda thought the same thing about us that the Japanese thought at the beginning of the 1940s. I think that Iraq and Afghanistan have begun to correct some of those impressions about us, but

we should be under no misapprehension. This war will last a long time. I believe that a very wide spectrum of American opinion would support the following view about it:

“We have been attacked by a congeries of totalitarian movement from the Middle East. Those who support and back them, such as their financiers or the masters of rogue states such as the ruling mullahs in Iran, are the enemy. This is a war. We are going to fight it and fight it with all like-minded democracies until we win.

#### **TOM SPENCER**

I think maybe it was my three years in advertising that persuaded me that perception is in itself a kind of reality. I have read the National Security document. I know the message which has been received by the rest of the world from the society that has, through Hollywood, been ‘the most sophisticated purveyor of myths and realities about itself’. What has been received by the rest of the world is precisely what you described as being what was not intended. It comes across as a license to rampage. You say that it depends on a dictatorship, on weapons of mass destruction and on an association with international terrorism. In the case of Iraq you win on the first one, but the last two look distinctly iffy. What has come across is a nervous and humiliated America behaving in a very aggressive way. That is the message that is being received. I say that without any pleasure.

To give you an example of exactly how radical the shock has been: I find myself defending the French! Many years ago I was the Assistant Director of the Referendum Campaign in Britain in 1975 when we took a vote on whether to stay in the European Union. As you know the European Union consists largely of Germans and French, and this was quite close to the memories of the Second World War. We were slightly worried, privately, that maybe there was a residual anti-German feeling that might affect the vote. Something not unknown in Norway and other countries contemplating membership of the European Union. So we set up some focus groups in geographical areas that had been particularly badly affected by the blitz. We were so surprised by the results that we took the groups again - with the same results. The result, and I paraphrase, was in essence: “Yes, we have had trouble with the Germans a couple of times this century, but basically they are like us. Their lavatories work, if they say they will do something they will, and if you leave them alone with your wife you will be all right and so will she”. The real enemy was the French, who failed on all three of those tests. We had the average educated or uneducated British talking about Crecy, Waterloo and Agincourt and the long story of British competition with French culture. Well I have to say the attack on the French has almost reached hysterical levels in the States that can only be explained by a deliberate attempt to play on weaknesses inside the European Union. So I find myself defending “Emperor Chirac”. Incidentally, the French do not really have an imperial tradition; rather it is a monarchical one that they never got over. I am not defending the details of Chirac’s position, but it was perfectly clear that Prime Minister Blair used feet put wrong by Chirac to cover his own flank domestically, and play on English Francophobia.

We should be careful with touching on these taboo subjects. If something does worry me about the nature of this debate it is the renewed willingness of people to trample on taboos. Someone said earlier in this conference – an American colleague – that the impact of September 11 saw “the removal of taboos on the exercise of power”. Now be careful about the removal of taboos, because taboos tend to be there for a reason. I found the attack on Europe as anti-Semitic, which was deliberately launched in the US in April a year ago, to be pretty close to being unacceptable. It might have invited equally off-colour responses about Native American genocide and inquiries into America’s racial policies etc. This is to descend to name calling. I think we can do better than that. We need to do better than that.

A final observation. If I were Mr Bin Laden sitting in Pakistan or wherever he is now, I think I would be pretty happy. I have succeeded in disrupting the Atlantic Alliance. I have succeeded in getting American troops out of Saudi Arabia. I have succeeded in recruiting a substantial number of people to my cause. While I have not fully radicalised the greater Middle East, which is actually my aim, I suspect I am a lot closer to it than I would have been two years ago. So far our response to Bin Laden, while being emotionally satisfying, has failed the ultimate test of Conservative politics. It has not been effective.

#### **R. JAMES WOOLSEY**

Al Qaeda I think has been badly damaged by the arrests and the military actions, particularly in Afghanistan. I think that they face at least the possibility that they have created circumstances in which both Afghanistan and Iraq may be moved into becoming most unfriendly governments from their point of view, namely democracies operating under the rule of law. It will take time and effort. We have to get that done. But the first step has certainly not been one that I would think left either the Islamists of the Middle East whether Iranian mullahs in Teheran or Bin Laden, or the Fascists such as the Baathists, in a position of happiness. I guess I will have to quote President Reagan "You ain't seen nothin' yet". You should not assume and Bin Laden should not assume that this will stop with what has been done so far. The most effective way to undermine may well be in a number of cases not militarily, but rather through intelligence and law enforcement co-operation and through undermining their ideology the way we did with Communism. This is something that will take decades. I don't agree that he should feel particularly happy or relaxed.

As far as impingements on liberties in the United States is concerned, I would quote Karl Sandburg "This old anvil laughs at many broken hammers." We have been running this Republic under the rule of law, with checks and balances, now for well over two centuries. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution in wartime – the Civil war, World War I, World War II – in such a way as to be reasonably relaxed about Executive Branch steps to improve security even at the expense of some liberties. When Congress and the Executive work together it has even permitted such things as the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War. Each time we have come back after these wars and civil liberties have stayed in place. The reason is – as my friend Michael Novak puts it – the American system of government: "In God we trust. For absolutely everyone else checks and balances". And if you think that civil liberties are fundamentally at risk in the US I think you will be proven wrong – in spite of some things in the USA Patriot Act and so forth. You will begin to see some of these steps having to do with right to council and immigration cases and so forth, which I also have been concerned about, change and move back in the direction of liberty. It has been going on now for nearly two and a quarter centuries.

Let me close with the weapons of mass destruction issue and ties to international terrorism. It is not just Tony Blair and George Bush who believe that the Iraqis had chemical and bacteriological weapons at least in the late 1990s and right up the time of the beginning of the war. Hans Blix believes that and said so five days ago to The Guardian. President Chirac said substantially the same thing. Saddam admitted in mid-1990s after his son-in-law defected (his son-in-law was head of the Iraqi biological weapons programme), even though his government had denied that there was a biological weapons programme at all, to having made 8,500 litres of anthrax. Colin Powell said in his speech to the Security Council that we thought they had made three times as much. But whatever the amount, if you believe that there was no anthrax or no chemical warfare agents in the late 90s in Iraq, I have got a bridge in Brooklyn I would be delighted to sell you.

The only evidence that the Iraqis had no such programs was Saddam Hussain's word. But he had used chemical weapons against the Kurds, and used them against the Iranians. The facilities were there for production and when confronted on the biological weapon side he admitted to having made them. The question is not whether or not these existed very recently, but what has happened to them. Where are they and the production facilities? I was on the BBC over a week ago and Robin Cook was on just after me. I said something like I have said here. Then he said, essentially: well, we understand that they had some chemical and bacteriological agents, but these are not weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction are huge things employing thousands of people to make, that can destroy cities.

We have a little definitional problem here. Most people who work in these areas, and I have been negotiating on these issues with the Soviets since 1969, generically call chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Chemical are really far less 'massively' effective in destroying than the others, but biological weapons can kill easily as many people as nuclear weapons, if they are deployed properly. If Saddam had only the 8,500 litres of anthrax that he admitted to having made, how much would that be? That sounds like a lot, and may sound as if they ought to be able to find it somewhere in Iraq. That is about 8.5 tons. But that's less than half a tractor-trailer truckload. If it is desiccated and turned into powder, like the anthrax that was used in the US in the fall of 2001, it is about 160 pounds: four medium size suitcases. Anthrax can be made in a facility about the size of, and very much with the same characteristics as, a micro-brewery such as might be attached to a restaurant. Chemical weapons can be made in fertiliser plants with some minor modifications. We are not, Mr Cook to the contrary, talking about large facilities employing thousands of people or city busting and

things like nuclear reactors. Stockpiles and facilities for chemical and especially bacteriological weapons may be relatively small and the agents themselves are relatively easy to destroy in incinerators. As we question Iraqis about what happened, I hope that we will find some of the facilities, some of the equipment and some of the people who worked on the programs. I think that it is a puzzle that will be solved. Anyone who believes that Iraq during this period did not have chemical and bacteriological agents is, I think, smoking something exciting.

As to the issue of whether the intelligence was spun or not spun, this is a complicated one. It is something we can talk about later if you want to.

Let me say one final word on ties to international terrorism. Saddam certainly sheltered international terrorists: Abu Nidal was there for years. Certainly there were connections of one kind or another to various terrorist groups supporting suicide bombers in the West Bank. Certainly Ansar El Islam who had strong ties to Al Qaeda and Iraqi intelligence, was operating along the northern Iraqi-Iranian border and had some ricin, a bacteriological agent. Certainly some Al Qaeda came through and, after Afghanistan fell, were being sheltered in Iraq.

Certainly Iraq had a training facility on the Southern edge of Baghdad called Salman Pak. They had an old Russian airliner and they trained – we know about the training from 5 different sources – not only Iraqi thugs in aircraft hijacking, but Islamist thugs from other countries who were fundamentalists and were kept separate from the Iraqis. They taught there in groups of five, among other things, to highjack airliners with short knives. Now, maybe that is a coincidence, we don't have any evidence at this point that any of the 19 of the 9/11 attack trained at Salman Pak. Somebody who trained them trained at Salman Pak. Maybe somebody passed on information about techniques. Who knows?

One does not have to prove that the Iraqi intelligence was intimately and directly involved in orchestrating 9/11 in order to understand that Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda were like two different Mafia families: they killed each other from time to time, they insulted each other all the time, but they hated us a lot more. And if you believe that it was impossible for Saddam and his intelligence service to undertake any kind of co-operation of any sort at all with fundamentalist Islamists terrorist groups I think that this would be an extremely – forgive the word – naive attitude about the brutality that can exist in the Middle East.

